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Reviewing previous works on the social implications of computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) unpacks two schools of thought in the literature: the optimist 
school, which bolsters the argument that CMC expands social relations and re-creates 
social identity; and the pessimist school, obdurate in the conviction that CMC decays 
strong networks and weakens interpersonal support. But the paradox turns out to be a 
tradeoff between width and depth. Unwittingly, there is a confluence of thought: both 
agree that intensive offline and dispersive online interactions contribute to social 
capital, mainly understood in psychological and relational dimensions. This has 
changed over time, due to numerous factors such as an increasing awareness of 
citizenship and a growing sense of community, the emergence of new social forces 
and voluntary organizations, active civic engagement and complex horizontal 
networking.  
 
This thesis holds the position that CMC provides new opportunities for social capital 
formation and explores the complex mechanisms underlying the process, synthetizing 
resource mobilization and social psychology theory. It addresses questions on the 
why, and how, people may be mobilized to voluntarily participate in virtual 
discussion and even offline actions through the different usage of social resources. 
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The empirical section then investigates the process in three main aspects: (i) resource 
usage, (ii) agents’ relations, and (iii) mobilization, employing content analysis of 
online posts, articles and documentary materials, online and offline interviews in a 
popular non-focused virtual community in China – Tianya. This section shows in 
detail: (1) how the social resources are redistributed through CMC; (2) how 
individuals’ use of these redistributed resources affects social relations and values; 
and (3) how resources embedded in different social relations sharing certain values 
can be mobilized for collective action. From the findings, the paper outlines three 
general patterns: (1) resources are redistributed through the creation of new resources 
and employment of existing resources; (2) relations are rebuilt in two dimensions – 
homophilous and heterophilous; and (3) collective actions are mobilized by collective 
identity, group leadership and social environment. Chapter 4 deals with the first two 
aspects, espousing that CMC tends to extricate people from their real lives, 
transforming them into virtual individuals without impairing their respective social 
roles, and (re)grouping them into associations within certain degree of state 
manipulation.  
 
Based on these discussions, Chapter 5 explores the process of collective mobilization, 
buttressed by in-depth case study of one high-profile event, the course of which was 
changed by CMC. The case chosen here is “Duo Maomao (Hide-and-seek)”, which 
highlights the irresponsibility of a local public security bureau in publicizing that a 
prisoner had died while playing “hide-and-seek”. The effects of CMC on collective 
	  vi 
mobilization depend on the nature of events, participants’ available resources, the 
structure and quality of interpersonal relations, community purposes, political 
grounds and many other factors. To this end, obstacles to social capital accumulation 
are also discussed, such as authoritarianism, and the ambiguities in community rules. 
	  vii 
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1.1  Background 
The mushrooming of information and communication technologies in China gives 
rise to a brand-new vocabulary — “CMC (Computer-mediated communication)” — 
used to describe communication based on the Internet. CMC has changed Chinese 
citizens’ lives to an enormous extent, penetrating diverse social areas such as human 
exploitation, nationalism, environment protection, anti-corruption, single parenthood, 
and so on. In China, social causes seem to go hand-in-hand with CMC, and it is rare 
for influential organizations not to have some form of Internet presence. 
 
This promising technological development brings about a new round of 
socio-economic transformation, one that raises citizens’ awareness and interest in 
civic participation, highlighting the weakness of civic engagement under current 
institutions, law and social norms. It is generally accepted that China is in dire 
deficiency of civic tradition, suffering from an “institutional vacuum” during this 
transitional period – including economic marketization, political democratization, and 
culture diversification. In this regard, existing channels cannot satisfy ordinary 
citizens’ increasing need for participation. Viewed in this context, CMC in virtual 
communities is considered a riskless, flexible, convenient and effective channel with 
which to convey political appeals and formulate political demands, especially for 
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ordinary, powerless and marginalized citizens.  
 
Initially, governments were willing to support CMC development for cheaper 
information, effective servicing, and instant public opinions. But often, circumstances 
and environments change since what social actors — as individuals, or groups of 
individuals — envisage and hope for is the transformation of political systems and 
governance, which they perceive to be ineffective. The crisis of legitimacy caused by 
their hope has seriously threatened state manipulation. On the other hand, CMC, as a 
new social operating system, is often an indispensible channel for the state to win the 
support of the masses and for the society to attain political legitimacy. 
 
Recent research on Internet use in China has focused on the power of technology in 
social life. The proliferation of the Internet has opened Pandora’s box for the public, 
allowing new accesses to information, and offering a public sphere for civic 
communication, interaction or even collective action. Without it, a limited civil 
society based on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) would provide citizens 
little room for political participation. It would have been inconceivable for the public, 
especially the marginalized, to convey ideas as effectively and quickly, let alone the 
opportunity to create a sense of citizenship as the very foundation of Chinese society. 
However, we should not be too quick to celebrate virtual interaction as a silver bullet 
for social illnesses, taking for granted that the Internet would revolutionize Chinese 
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society. In fact, Chinese Internet is increasingly scrutinized and under stringent state 
control and supervision, and this has left considerable effects on Chinese society. 
 
Two aspects that are often ignored or not explored in research on Chinese Internet 
analysis including: (1) cyberspace as just one part of social space, rather than as 
something contradicting it; (2) it is individuals’ participation in online activities, and 
not the information technology in itself, that is key to creating civic environment and 
social assets. However, these are the two preconditions of this research. As Jones 
pointed out, the social landscape of the Internet is important in these aspects: 
It is not that distance I made meaningless, but once we are all 
connected in cyberspace we are then infinitely distant from one 
another when we are not communicating…It is ours to fill and try to 
save rather than to experience and understand. 1 
To put it another way, cyberspace is promoted as social space 
because it is made by people, and thus as the “new public space” it 
conjoins traditional mythic narratives of progress with the strong 
modern impulses toward self-fulfillment and personal development.2 
Within this brand-new social space, contentious social events arise and are spread 
around China every now and then, becoming attractive fodder for informed netizens. 
 
1.2  Problem Description 
The technological possibility, social pressure, as well as personal yearning for 
connectedness, give rise to flourishing virtual communities. Over time, Chinese 
citizens have become increasingly active in CMC, which helps the society step into a 
                                                        
1 Steven G. Jones, Virtual Culture: Identity and Communication in Cybersociety (London, Britain: SAGE 
Publications, 1997), 12. 
2 Ibid, 22.  
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new age of civic engagement.3 Netizens read, think and participate, but few have 
cognizance as to what exactly they are doing online, and whether, and how, their 
actions matter to the social landscape. But this is not the reason to ignore its 
momentous effects. 
 
There are various perspectives to understand the repertoire of CMC on social capital. 
One school of thought argues that Internet usage expands the scope of social capital, 
promotes social integration, facilitates collective action and sustains social stability.4 
Another school views virtual activities as the main factor in decreasing civic 
engagement, voluntary organization membership and resulting in a more fragmented 
society. 5  A more contextual perspective emphasizes that “Internet use neither 
consumes nor produces trust”.6 The dilemma exists mostly in democratic countries 
that have both comprehensive institutions and a rich “civic culture” to lubricate social 
cooperation and influence government policies. In authoritarian China, virtual 
communities — the focal sites for isolated individuals to meet up — should serve a 
                                                        
3 According to the latest Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (January 2010) by CNNIC (China 
Internet Network Information Center), the number of Chinese people participating in BBS (Bulletin Board System) 
forums was 117.01 million, increased by 26.01 million. 
4 Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Bruce Bimber, Cynthia Stohl and Andrew J. Flanagin, “Technological Change and the 
Shifting Nature of Political Organizaiton”, in Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics, ed. Andrew Chadwick and 
Philip N. Howard. (London and New York: Routledge, 2009). 
5 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 2000); Norman H. Nie, “Sociability, Interpersonal Relations, and the Internet: Reconciling Conflicting 
Findings”, American Behavioral Scientist 45, 3 (2001): 420-435; Peter A. Hall, “Great Britain: The Role of 
Government and the Distribution of Social Capital”, in Democracies in Flux: The evolution of Social Capital in 
Contemporary Society, ed, Robert D. Putnam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
6 Marc A. Smith. “Voices from the WELL: The Logic of the Virtual Commons”. Master diss., University of 
California, 1992; Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Reading, 
Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993); James E. Katz and Ronald E. Rice, Social Consequences of 
Internet Use: Access, Involvement, and Interaction (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002); Barry Wellman and 
Calroline Haythornthwaite, The Internet in everyday life (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Eric M. Uslaner, “Social 
Capital and the Net”, in The Internet in Public Life, ed., Gehring, Verna V. Lanham. (Md.: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., 2004). 
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crucial role in social cooperation. The ongoing challenge for scholarship on the 
Chinese experience, then, is the causal connections with organized structure. 
 
We should, therefore, ask: how does CMC in Chinese virtual communities affects 
social capital under tightening state control? Does the Chinese government’s 
authoritarian political system matter? Who are these participants in virtual 
communities, and why do they choose to participate? Does online interaction spill 
over into offline life? Compared with face-to-face communication, what are the 
prominent features of CMC? To answer these questions, this thesis makes a synergy 
of resource mobilization and social psychology theories to tell people what is actually 
happening to CMC, and where it could go from here. 
 
This synergy considers both rational choices of resource usage and emotional feelings 
of shared grievance, deriving directly from relevant collective action theory. It takes 
into account both the ingrained cultural and political situations, and the irresistible 
trend of individualization in this transitional period. This could be particularly helpful 
in explaining collective mobilization through CMC, since the two aspects respond to 




                                                        
7 James Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, American Journal of Sociology 94 
Supplement (1988): s95-s120. 
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1.3  Research Design and Methodology  
An ethnographic approach is adopted to explain the variety of mechanisms 
constructing social capital through CMC and understand the operation of the 
ecological habitus. To accurately report what is going on in virtual communities, it is 
ideal if the researcher has been actively involved with them. On this note, I have been 
a heavy Internet user for over five years, considering myself especially well versed 
with the Chinese virtual space. I am a member of many communities such as Tianya, 
Qiangguo Luntan, and several university BBS forums. The experience of searching 
information, observing others’ behaviors, joining in their conversations by posting 
gives me deep understanding of CMC in China. As an ordinary netizen, I have 
witnessed or experienced the revolutionary power and dark side of CMC, state power 
and society reaction, and have felt and experienced the sense of community, of 
“belonging”. As a researcher in this area, I have observed what others are doing 
online and their perceptions of this new technology in general. I have kept a watchful 
eye on possible social reactions to multifarious online phenomenon and the patterns 
of these reactions in affecting social capital. 
 
Tianya is one of the most popular virtual communities in China, embracing nearly all 
kinds of acephalous discussions online, widely publicizing many high profile cases on 
the Internet, which makes it the optimal platform by which to investigate the social 
landscape of Chinese virtual communities. To narrow the research scope and for 
greater accuracy, I chose to base my content analysis on one sub-community in 
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Tianya — “Tianya Zatan” — primarily because, unlike other columns, this group is 
sufficiently diverse and, at the same time, does not show apparent political color, 
social or economic biases. Under this condition, participation can be regarded as more 
spontaneous, non-purposive and voluntary, in accordance with the inclusiveness of 
social capital and neutrality of CMC.  
 
In addition to this personal experience, other methods used in this thesis include: 
(1) Secondary sources such as media reports, published information and documentary 
materials. Statistical reports from some research organizations, such as China 
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), and World Internet Project, were used as the starting point. I 
present an overview of the demographic distribution of Chinese netizens from 
CNNIC’s Statistical Survey Report on Internet Development. I also utilized ideas 
from documents published on Chinese online participation as the basis for my 
field research and online interviews.  
 
(2) Ethnographic research, starting with general information and relative questions 
that arise from my research. Every day, for three months, from August 19 to 
November 18, 2010, I logged on and viewed online posts in Tianya at a fixed time 
— 21:00 hours — with the aim of making qualitative sampling more scientific 
and random, and controlling interview bias. Each day, for convenience and 
simplicity, I chose just 10 out of 100 posts, at a distance of 10 posts, from the 
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front page of Tianya Zatan. 
 
(3) Content analysis of the selected daily posts for two purposes: (a) to obtain 
statistical data of online posts categorization in Tianya Zatan; (b) to explore the 
process of voluntary participation and the mechanisms of forming and 
transforming social capital during this process. For the first purpose, sustaining 
analyses on posts’ themes and content can work. For the second, I recognized that 
prolonged effort should be made to observe what happens, as well as to participate 
in discussions to obtain data firsthand. In the absence of a standard qualitative 
research method, I adopted an approach that would include all data that could 
inform me of CMC, which I believe is essential for understanding variations in 
personal feelings and participatory motivations over time.  
 
To Malinowski, time is a crucial element of ethnographic research. To avoid or 
mitigate the feeling of obtrusiveness, a researcher has to spend as much time as 
possible living with people who are being observed. As he put it: 
It must be remembered that as the natives saw me constantly 
everyday, they ceased to be interested or alarmed, or made 
self-conscious by my presence, and I ceased to be a disturbing 
element in the tribal life that I was to study.8 
 
Fortunately, online observation can take place without the explicit need to alert 
the subject being studied. I was able to passively observe on the sidelines without 
                                                        
8 Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and adventure in the 
Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea (New York: Dutton, 1992), 8. 
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disturbing the usual threads of debate and discussion. In short, I took on an active 
participant role in online activities with the intention of looking into others’ 
feelings, yet striving to remain level headed enough to record my observations.   
 
(4) Observation and content analysis, collecting evidence to support or challenge the 
hypotheses, after which interviews could then be carried out. There are diverse 
ways of interviewing, such as casual chats, individual and group interviews, and 
so on. In terms of location, interviews in this research are divided into real-life 
and online interviews. At the beginning, interviews-in-person were carried out in 
Beijing, China, with different social actors including government officials (five), 
media workers (five) and professors (four), on their perceptions of CMC. With 
their permission, a tape recorder was used; this enabled easy retrospection. 
Real-life interviews allowed me to test their perspectives in light of previous 
academic work, news reports and commentary, and also to verify or improve on 
the propositions in my proposal. 
 
(5) Online interview, which was key to this research, using mainly private messaging, 
which offered little threat to identity revelation. This turned out to be both 
advantageous and disadvantageous. Although netizens were generally more 
willing to accept online interviews that gave the assurance of greater anonymity, it 
also meant that they could ignore these interview requests, as they were less 
accountable to the interviewer. Under this condition, interpersonal relationships 
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with some community members, or at least being familiar with them, were 
significant. Once started, snowball sampling was indispensible. 
 
This research draws upon research into the participants’ daily lives in Tianya, 
during which 17 online interviews with Tianyaers were conducted (5 moderators, 
6 activists, 6 ordinary members). These were netizens who responded to my 
personal invitation on Tianya to participate in this research project. I selected 
those I wanted to target, making sure I had relatively equal numbers of 
interviewees in the three groups (moderators, activists, ordinary members) of 
netizens. Thus, their views were not necessarily representative of all or most 
Tianyaers, but could reflect main aspects of CMC in Tianya. Their “speaking” 
styles and potential attitudes were also carefully recorded and transcribed.   
 
(6) Online interviews, which were the most important and tedious part of my 
methodology. From the outset, I informed interviewees of my identity and 
purpose of research. They allowed me to record and use our text-based chatting 
records. Thus, the open-ended style of collecting data/interview was preferred. I 
also provided an outline of general aspects that guided my research objectives 
(Appendix A). But the actual questions were still subjected to a level of 
discretion. The aim here was to understand how people felt in their capacity as 
online moderators, activists or ordinary members, rather than be influenced by my 
thought processes. All interviews were conducted in Chinese. 
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(7) An in-depth case study of Duo Maomao, in which CMC played a huge factor and 
provided empirical evidence on this topic. I scrutinized archives from Tianya. A 
particularity of this case was the government-netizen cooperation in promoting 
collective action: the “Truth Investigation Committee”, with representation from 
both government officials and netizens. The most influential members of this 
committee were from Tianya, which suited the ongoing analysis. Although great 
debates engender on the investigation committee, the occurrence of this case is the 
first attempt in opening up investigation and expanding channels for civic 
engagement. This case study provided insights into how social events may play 
out in a typical Chinese virtual community. 




As the thesis mainly explores the mechanisms of constructing social capital through 
CMC in virtual communities, the literature is comprised of two parts: social capital 
and CMC. The first section of this chapter, therefore, presents a theory of social 
capital on the part of social actors who invest and mobilize it under different social 
contexts, by categorizing existing research into three branches: resource theory, 
network theory and capability theory. It then derives a comprehensive theory of social 
capital that accords with resource mobilization and social psychology theories of 
social movements. Firmly anchored within these two theories, the second section 
summaries the influences of CMC on social capital: resource distribution, relations 
building and collective mobilization. It aims at bridging the conceptual gap between 
CMC and social capital. Finally, the third section sets forth the theoretical framework 
of the mechanisms in Chinese virtual communities.9  
 
2.1  General Theories of Social Capital 
The concept of social capital was proposed initially by sociologists to comprehend the 
informal culture appreciating social support, social cohesion, and social coalescence 
in any society, which concerns a payoff among multiple social actors. Despite its 
                                                        
9 The specialty of this approach lies in its combination of resource mobilization and social psychology theories. 
Most opponents of resource mobilization theory criticize that it imputes a neutral characteristic to the use of 
technology, pays little attention to the cultural aspect of collective action, and focuses mainly on the micro- and 
meso-levels of social implication. This paper then presents a more syntopian understanding on the topic.  
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short history, there are remarkable complexities and disputes on its sources, features, 
performance and effects. The differences between the myriad definitions of social 
capital are not fundamental but, rather, stem from different approaches or angles used 
to frame the distinction. Researchers define it in relation to their operational purposes 
and for the sake of explanatory value, as do the three branches of social capital 
concept presented below10 . There is no clear-cut distinction or incompatibility 
between them; rather, they can co-exist or even be mutually inclusive to some extent. 
The study of these theories aims to look for connections and to incorporate them into 
a new matrix of social capital, rather than seeking to create a new theory. This 
conceptualization details processes operating between determinants and manifestation 
of social capital, attempting to reach a general pattern for a CMC discussion. 
 
2.1.1 Resource Theory 
Resource theory coins the essence of social capital as multiple resources — both 
material and symbolic — that can be employed for the interests of individuals as well 
as the collective. The nature of the resources, the access to resources, and the 
purposes for which they are used, determine the variety of civic associations, 
participation in civic affairs, and senses of community.11 Bourdieu asserts that one’s 
available resources, anchored in certain groups or a clump of social structure built on 
                                                        
10 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Social Capital”, in Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of 
Education, edited by John G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986); Coleman, 1988; Francis Fukuyama, 
Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995); Nan Lin, Social Capital: A 
Theory of Social Structure and Action (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); James E. Katz, 
and Ronald E. Rice, Social Consequences of Internet Use: Access, Involvement, and Interaction (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 2002). 
11 Ibid. 
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mutual acquaintance, is the central part and a distinctive advantage of social capital. 
Based on Bourdieu’s discussion on the three types of capital, one of which is social 
capital, Lin contends that resource is at the core of all kinds of capital, which includes 
“material goods such as land, houses, cars and money and symbolic goods such as 
education, club membership, honorific degrees, nobility or organizational titles, 
family names, reputation, or fame”12.  
 
In terms of ownership or access, both Bourdieu and Lin agree that gaining and using 
social capital is more likely an outcome of group activities elicited by individual 
interests in investment.13 They interpret social capital as a cross-dimensional concept: 
although it cannot be formed without individual behaviors, social capital does not 
situate its power in any single individual; it is the combination of individual and 
collective aspects that constitutes this concept. The particularity of every individual 
indicates the inevitability of resource-distribution inequality, making the dynamics of 
resource redistribution/exchange possible and important. Through exchanges of 
resources among social actors, values may be added, and connections built. Besides, 
social resources are only accessible through social networks. Their approach 
reconciles structural inequalities and constructivist interpretations of human agency. 
 
 
                                                        
12 Lin, 2001, 43. 
13 This coincides with the social background of the popularity of social capital research in America in the 1980s. 
The emergence of communitarianism in response to individualism, on which social capital concept was built, 
emphasized on both individual rights and collective interests. 
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2.1.2 Network Theory  
This theory or approach explores the structural aspects of social capital — social 
networks, their patterns, density and strengths — where resources are embedded, and 
categorized into homophilous and heterophilous14, and strong and weak types. The 
purpose of these two ways of categorization is similar: to explore the diversity of 
relation building.15 Specifically, it is to explore how people access and use resources 
differently and how these differences affect their social networks.  
 
In measuring, both Coleman and Putnam concentrate on membership in voluntary 
associations. For Coleman, “all social relations and social structures facilitate some 
forms of social capital”16 but only certain kinds of social relations that bear the 
feature of “closure” can contribute to social cooperation significantly. It is the 
“closure” of social networks — the homophilous type — that creates trustworthiness 
and effective norms. The heterophilous type shapes inter-group connections with 
people of significant differences in one or more aspects, such as backgrounds or 
knowledge, which is more difficult to construct.  
 
Although not by nature benign or malign, nevertheless, homophilous networks are 
often more likely to build strong relations; heterophilous networks are weaker in 
terms of the frequency and intensity of interaction. This engenders another way of 
                                                        
14 Lin use the two terms “homophilous” and “heterophilous”, which have the same meaning as the expression of 
“bonding” and “bridging” in Putnam’s term. 
15 For Bourdieu, Putnam and Coleman, although homophilous networks are recognized as not praiseworthy by 
nature, they are still been paid exclusive attention to and imputed a benign nature. And their categorization of 
homo- and heterophilous networks is to decide which is better for social development. 
16 Coleman, 1988, S105. 
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categorization: the strong and weak networks. According to previous researches, 
social capital is the accumulated return or manifestation of social relations formed in 
voluntary organizations, such as in churches, trade union, bird-watching clubs and so 
on.17 The change in associational membership, therefore, as Putnam proposes, is the 
main factor in the decline of social capital in the last half of 20th century America. 
Ideally, social capital within a group brings about a host of benefits for that group, but 
not necessarily for the wholesome development of the entire community. However, 
the concentration on closure ignores the importance of bridging ties that could help 
people with more or better resources.  
 
Similarly, some researchers take it for granted that strong ties in formal associations 
are more powerful than weak ties in informal community groups.18 However, on 
closer inspection, weak relations formed through civic participation, such as working, 
chatting with friends and relatives, studying and debating issues, seem to be more 
likely to involve people.19 With fewer boundaries, weak relations help to preserve 
personal integrity, creativity and provide new opportunities for collective evolution.  
 
                                                        
17 Putnam defines social capital as “connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness that arise from them” in Bowling alone, p19. Simply put, the return or manifestation of 
resource investment in his definition includes trust, norms of reciprocity and social networks. 
18 Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 2000; Theda Skocpol, and Morris P. Fiorina, “Making Sense of the Civic Engagement 
Debate”. In Civic Engagement in American Democracy, edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). 
19 Mark Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties”, American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973): 1360-1380, “The 
Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited”, Sociology Theory 1 (1983): 201-233, “Economic Action 
and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness”, American Journal of Sociology 91 (1985): 481–510; Hall, 
2002; Robert Wuthnow, “Bridging the Privileged and the Marginalized”, in Social Capital: A Multifacete 
Perspective, edited by Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, 59-102 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000; 
Bourdieu, 1985; Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1994); Robert D. Putnam, 
Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Putnam, 2000.  
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Besides structures, another school of network theory highlights the quality and 
content of social relations, which “describes the relationships capturing the innate 
feeling people have towards each other and the things they need to do in order to get 
along well and work together toward achievement of common goals”20. Generally, it 
covers a wide range of social values, including trust, reciprocity, identity and 
emotional feelings to help glue different social parts together. Without it, perhaps, 
individuals may disperse, informal social relations wither, society subsides, and even 
rebellion could take place when state control becomes unbearable. For instance, the 
social identity of being a citizen, which Coleman describes as “entering into a 
promiscuous relationship with strangers within a political community”21, guarantees 
the sustainability of these relations. Otherwise, indifference, cynicism and even hatred 
would overwhelm our daily life.  
 
In addition, social norms of reciprocity, which depend on the expectation or 
speculation of reward in the future for the help provided in the present, have turned 
out to be the basis of social support.22 Coleman finds these norms are actions that 
have “similar externalities for a set of others”23 that people rely on to form and 
sustain social relations. Together with other shared values, reciprocity benefits 
relations in its capacity to reduce the transaction costs and increase interaction 
                                                        
20 Ben Kei Daniel. Social Capital in Virtual Communities: Bayesian Belief Network Approaches (Hershey, PA: 
Information Science Reference, 2009), 30. 
21 Stephen Coleman and Jay G. Blumier. The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4. 
22 Barry Wellman, “Applying Network Analysis to the Study of Support”, in Social Networks and Social Support, 
edited by Benjamin H. Gottlieb (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981). 
23 Coleman, 1994, 251. 
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possibilities. In return, these relations will strengthen the values shared by participants. 
The structure and content of social networks thus seem to complement each other. 
 
Compared to measuring the relational dimension by atomizing it into multiple 
indicators to get an average number within one group, region or nation, much less has 
been done to explain the questions of “who has what kinds of social capital at 
different times in a particular context, and why?” Previous research ignores the fact 
that social capital can never be distributed evenly among different social actors, and 
dismisses the diversity of resources and networks. Instead, the academic community 
has paid much attention to the capability of social networks in lubricating cooperation. 
A great amount of research thus frames the theory based on its capability. 
 
2.1.3 Capability Theory 
Once patterns of access to social resources and networks have been delineated, it is 
time for researchers to interpret the possible outcomes or contributions of these 
resources. This is the essence of capability theory. Capability theory outlines social 
capital in a more utilitarian way by focusing on the effects it could bring to actors. For 
instance, Fukuyama interprets it as the ability to promote interpersonal cooperation 
conducive to effective economic development and associational life. 24  He 
emphasizes that whether certain norms can be components of social capital depends 
on their ability to lubricate cooperation. Moreover, Coleman also believes that social 
                                                        
24 Francis Fukuyama, 1995; “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development”, Third World Quarterly 22(2001): 
7-20. 
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capital can only be defined by its function. The problem with this school is that it 
confuses causes with effects and exclusively concentrates on benign aspects of social 
capital. However, it is the starting point to explore the more practical side of this 
social asset — mobilizing collective actions in maintaining their existing resources, or 
creating new ones to deal with personal and social issues. For Fukuyama, ways of 
mobilization in the economic sphere include the state, religion and globalization.25  
 
Table 2.1 Different Theories of Social Capital 





Available resources built on 
mutual acquaintance, 
Material and symbolic type, 
For both individual and 
collective interests 
Networks build on 
resource exchange. 
Resources are only 
accessible through 
social networks 






(1983) Weak and strong ties 
Networks should be 
mobilized in collective 
action to maintain 
existing resources or 




closure between networks 
Putnam 
(2000) 
Bonding and bridging 
networks 
Macro-level reciprocity 






Facilitate certain actions of 
individuals within the networks Mobilize Collective 
actions in an economic 
perspective Fukuyama 
(1995) 
The ability of people to work 
together for common purposes 
 
From the earlier discussions, Table 2.1 presents a comparison of different theories of 
social capital. Modified from Lin’s definition, this thesis defines social capital as 
                                                        
25 Fukuyama, 1995; “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development”, Third World Quarterly 22(2001): 17-19. 
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social resources embedded in networks formed through resource exchange, which can 
be mobilized in collective actions.  
 
2.2  CMC in Virtual Communities and Social Capital 
As a medium for public opinion in this information era, CMC in virtual communities 
has proliferated new forms of communication and new ways of life, and is likely to 
continue to spread and flourish. As a result, it is inevitable that resource allocation, 
availability, opportunity structure and constraints, and social demands will continue to 
be reformulated. Based on theories discussed above, this section sketches the ways of 
CMC by which social resources are redistributed, social networks formed and 
collective actions mobilized. Before interpreting CMC in virtual communities, we 
should first rethink the concept of community. 
 
2.2.1 The Community and Virtual Community 
A traditional community is broadly recognized as a group of organisms building on 
the face-to-face communication of people living within physical proximity. Broadly 
speaking, studies on communities generalize two main conceptual threads: 
geographical and relational. Similarly, Riger and Lavrakas identify two significant 
elements of urban neighborhoods: social bonding and physical rootedness.26 Most 
early studies pay too much attention to locality: community members must live 
together and talk to each other face-to-face. The sense of community, under this 
                                                        
26 Stephanie Riger and Paul J. Lavrakas, “Community Ties Patterns of Attachment and Social Interaction in Urban 
Neighborhoods”, American Journal of Community Psychology 9 (1981): 55-66. 
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condition, is the strong feeling of belonging to groups within geographic boundaries.  
 
Nevertheless, scholars later acknowledge that “relation” is an essential part of 
community, although geography still plays a significant role. Gusfield claims that 
there should be communities defined primarily according to relationships, such as a 
community of scholars in the same field sharing ideas but living in different parts of 
the world.27 Using Bender’s ideas, Jones shifts the focus away from geography to 
relations as the core of communities. He argues that communities should be defined 
by their social networks, not their physical or geographical territories, and that focus 
on localities ignores, or even contradicts, the cultural implication of communities.28  
 
Since then, community research has developed into articulating the specialty and 
types of relations, an area that is increasingly being called attention to. One 
perspective emphasizes the structure, marked by different levels of connectivity and 
intensity of relations: horizontal and hierarchical, bonding and bridging, weak and 
strong networks. Another stresses on normative values such as personal feelings, 
ideas and sense of community. In general, Taylor proposes that “community…means 
a group of people (1) who have beliefs and values in common, (2) whose relations are 
direct and many-sided and (3) who practise generalized as well as balanced 
reciprocity”29.  
                                                        
27 Joseph R. Gusfield, The Community: A Critical Response (New York: Harper Colophon, 1975). 
28 Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change in America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
1978). 
29 Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 23. 
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These three components of a community are the social dimensions of a virtual 
community that, according to Baym, are affected by CMC’s appropriating social 
resources and rules.30 A widely used definition proposed by Rheingold, the creator of 
one early online community “The Well”, defines virtual communities as “social 
aggregations that emerge from the Internet when enough people carry on those public 
discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal 
relationships in cyberspace”31. Virtual communities have opened up a new social 
milieu where people share common interests, ideas, and feelings on sundry occasions 
without “showing up”. Communities in this sense are no longer limited to villages and 
neighborhoods with concrete structures, but are now more related to social relations 
based on CMC, without which they could not have come into being, or would 
eventually dissolve. Formed by participants’ communally “living together”, a virtual 
community is the convergence of “electronically mediated social relationships built 
around enhanced community values”32. These two dimensions link CMC to social 
capital research into how it has transformed the components, features and dimensions 




                                                        
30 Nancy K. Baym, “The Emergence of Online Community”, in Cybersociety 2.0: Revisiting Computer-Mediated 
Communication and Community, ed. Steven G. Jones (Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
1998). Other terms that mean the same as “virtual community” include “virtual society”, “cyber society”, and 
“electronic community”. 
31 Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier (Reading, Mass.: 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993), 5. 
32 Steve Woolgar, Virtual Society?: Technogy, Cyberbole, Reality. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002, 2). 
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2.2.2 Influences of CMC on Social Capital 
The above discussions give the impression that a virtual community should be like a 
model, with CMC in the core, flanked by the dual environments of reality and 
virtuality that encourages debates. This section reviews the debates between two 
extremes on the social repercussions of virtual communication, by grouping relevant 
literature from a wide array of sources into three groups: resource accessibility 
variance, structural and cognitive changes of social networks, and collective action. 
By doing so, I hope to discover the approaches by which CMC affects social capital, 
inspiring the theoretical framework of mechanisms in China. 
 
(1) Resource Accessibility Variance: Digital Divide 
Some argue that the over-reliance on personal digital knowledge and the unequal 
resource distribution among social actors give rise to a digital divide. On the one 
hand, resource distribution among social actors is unlikely to be completely fair, due 
to geographic, economic and political differences. On the other hand, social actors’ 
skills in making use of CMC vary from each other. Nie’s study finds that “Internet 
users compared to non-users report greater sociability and interconnectivity primarily 
because they are more educated, wealthier, and younger — not because they are 
Internet users”33. CMC, in this case, will cause harm within society, such as 
broadening the gaps between the haves and have-nots, the rich and poor, the educated 
and uneducated, the urban and rural.  
                                                        
33 Norman H. Nie, “Sociability, Interpersonal Relations, and the Internet: Reconciling Conflicting Findings”, 
American Behavioral Scientist 45, 3 (2001): 429. 
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However, Lin challenges this perspective: the divide is inevitable and not caused by 
CMC per se; CMC does not narrow these gaps, but instead redistributes the resources 
between different social actors and “provide an equalizing opportunity in the access to 
social capital”34. Even more, people’s moving away from some offline activities is 
precisely the deconstruction of existing social ties, on which the networking ability of 
CMC builds. CMC must necessarily be different from real-life communication, and it 
requires participants to re-position themselves. Only then is a new networking society 
likely to emerge.  
 
(2) Structural and Cognitive Changes of Social Networks 
Structuralism explains the recursive mechanisms of CMC by exploring how the 
redistribution of rules and resources changes structural aspect of social relations. 
Critics perceive that CMC is inexorably encroaching on the existing social landscape, 
when time consumption is considered. Putnam believes that online participation is not 
merely suboptimal but could even be harmful to vigorous civic engagement, because 
of the privatization of leisure time caused by the rapid development of the Internet, 
especially among the younger generation.35 Similarly, Nie thinks that CMC should be 
responsible for the “continuing decline of arenas for face-to-face relationships”36. 
Surely, some existing networks will be strengthened and new ties built by CMC, at 
the expense of old local networks. And new types of networks are always loose and 
                                                        
34 Nan Lin, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 227. 
35 Time, as a specific type of resource, according to Nie, can only be redistributed, yet not expanded. This means 
that spending time on one activity or interest must surely affect the time that could have been spent on another. 
36 Nie, 2001, 434. 
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weak. The problem here is that he has over-relied on face-to-face communication, 
mutual acquaintance and recognition, and neglected the importance of many other 
approaches through which people form connections.  
 
More precisely, CMC is not the antithesis of civic engagement but part of people’s 
daily life. It does not necessarily create or destroy social interaction. With regard to 
time consumption, anonymity in cyberspace makes shy people feel more comfortable 
to communicate. Also, people in certain types of occupations can work at home 
through online operations that allow them time with their families. The flexibility that 
people derive from CMC thus contributes to undermining external controls. 
According to Wellman, along with the routinization of CMC as one part of people’s 
daily life, virtual contact — especially via email — complements social relations in 
person.37 Many pundits in this camp claim that new types of relationships based on 
shared interests, ideas, and identity are in the formation, which Castells and Wellman 
describe as “networked individualism”38. 
 
For individuals, new types of networks with diversity and ubiquitous connectivity 
enhance their capacity to get social support. Although turning individuals into more 
independent and separate figures, CMC is also weaving labyrinthine networks 
connecting them together. At the community level, they tend to transform 
                                                        
37 Wellman, 2002. He thinks that frequent use of email to contact relatives and friends does not create people’s 
sense of community and social relations, but provides a new space for those already involved to be more active. 
38 Networked individualism, in Wellman and Castells’ accounts, is a social pattern linking dispersed individuals 
with a variety of others, which as a result forms the basis of virtual communities. 
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“all-encompassing, social controlling communities” into networked societies where 
“boundaries are more permeable, interactions are with diverse others, linkages switch 
between multiple networks, and hierarchies are flatter and more recursive”39.  
 
Not only does CMC affect the structure of social relations, it also changes the quality 
of these relations. Nie argues that CMC is incapable of expressing important emotions 
with the same depth as face-to-face communication.40 Whatever benign impacts 
CMC will bring cannot compensate for the declined social interaction caused by it. 
Similar findings are provided by Putnam’s discussion about trust, which encourages 
people to come together as group members. 41  But journeying through virtual 
communities undermines that very trust. The problem in this perspective is that, being 
just one indicator of social capital, trust is not always the most important value 
affecting the quality of social relations. Besides, trust plays a different role, or rather, 
social interactions have different foci in different social contexts. 
 
Advocates devote more to the creation of online social identities. One trait of CMC, 
which is acorporal in nature, as Smith argues, shares many of the characteristics of 
real interaction but differs from it in its possibility to keep participants away from the 
stigma of social identity, thereafter, freeing them to recreate their own identities.42 
The importance of rethinking about oneself and rebuilding one’s identity lies in the 
                                                        
39 Barry Wellman, “Physical Place and Cyberspace: the Rise of Personalized Networking”, International Journal 
of Urban and Regional Research 25 (2001): 227. 
40 Nie, 2001, 432. 
41 Putnam, 1993, 2000. 
42 Smith, 1992. 
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possibility of molding a healthy conception of who we are. Everyone has multiple 
personal identities within society; as consumers, producers, students, men, women, 
children, parents, and self-governed citizens.43 CMC offers rich opportunities for 
participants to explore and present their many selves, through homepage viewing, life 
experience sharing, joint artistic expression and political expression. That is exactly 
where collective identities and social relations come into being. In addition, online 
chatting and email exchanges with friends and relatives, and surfing the web for 
recreational purposes, are all associated with a general sense of community.44  
 
(3) Collective Actions 
One significant implications of CMC in virtual communities is the provision of public 
goods for collective mobilization. These collective goods are especially important in 
increasingly individualized societies to form or maintain social connections, which 
were previously achieved only by the state or NGOs.45 According to resource 
mobilization theory, this group of collective goods refers to available resources at 
hand through participants’ networks, which are in accordance with personal 
interests.46 In social psychology theory, these collective goods are only employable 
when participants have achieved shared values.47 This section combines the two. In 
                                                        
43 Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); 
Stephen Coleman, and Jay G. Blumier, The Internet and Democratic Citizenship: Theory, Practice and Policy, 
(Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
44 Wellman, 2002; Castells, 2001; Turkle, 1995. 
45 W. Lance Bennet, and Amoshaun Toft, “Identity, technology, and narratives: transnational activism and social 
networks”, in Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics, edited by Andrew Chadwick and Philip N. Howard 
(London; New York: Routledge, 2009). 
46 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).  
47 Caroline Kelly and Sara Breinlinger, The Social Psychology of Collective Action: Identity, Injustice and Gender 
(London:Taylor & Francis, 1996). 
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general, according to Van de Donk et al., Internet-based collective action does not 
replace offline protests, but instead,  
The use of the Internet affects the internal structure of social 
movement organizations, above all the density and direction of their 
links … there is ample evidence that ICTs are conducive to forging 
(temporary) alliances and coalitions, both vertical and horizontal, 
across different movements.48 
 
Both Van de Donk and Tilly highlight the importance of group size and admit that 
online activists are important in forming social relations and shared identity. Further, 
McCaughey and Ayers argue that the speed of Internet-based protests is made 
possible by CMC’s ability to connect dispersive individuals from both marginal 
groups and activist groups into macro-level networks.49 But their attention has been 
focused on recording the structure, strength and power of networks online to show 
that CMC has changed existing social relations, with great variation. Little has been 
done to explore how these networks in the qualitative sense affect the possibility and 
ways of collective mobilization. In the next section, I turn to the dynamics of 
constructing social capital through CMC in a theoretical account. 
 
2.3  CMC and Social Capital in China 
Along with the rapid growth rate of Internet technology since China’s official 
establishment of the World Wide Web in 1994, there has been a succession of 
                                                        
48 Van de Donk et al., “Introduction: Social Movements and ICTs”, in Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens and 
Social Movements, edited by Wim Van de Donk et al. (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), 19. 
49 Martha McCaughey and Michael D. Ayers, Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice (New York: 
Routledge, 2004) 
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scholarly researches on its social and political implications. This section has therefore 
deduced the following propositions concerning the detailed process of them. 
 
2.3.1 Decentralization Through CMC 
Inspired by the ideas from Jonathan Bach and David Stark50, Yang rightly broaches 
that Chinese civil society and the Internet interact in a co-evolutionary way. To be 
precise, the Internet on the one hand functions as an instrument for the government to 
get public opinions and legitimize its institutions and, on the other, allows citizens to 
express their perspectives and challenge institutional deficiency. In studying 
intellectual web sites and interviewing Minjian (unofficial, private) writers51, Zhou 
also agrees that involvement in cyberspace has contributed dramatically to the 
expansion of civil society. Yet, he has reservations on its democratic appeal since “the 
state has taken the initiative in entering cyberspace by enlisting cooperation from 
intellectual establishments, as shown by the case of Century China”52.  
 
This speculation is well corroborated in Tai’s work from a media perspective. In his 
account, the highly centralized state power and national focus of modernization in 
China has resulted in “compliance ideology”. Most political practices, seemingly 
dressed as “democratic”, are actually a function of elites’ political ideas or 
commitment to achieve political performance. They are designed to veil citizens in 
                                                        
50 See his discourse analysis of “Strengthening the Nation Forum”. <www.hxzq.net>. 
51 By comparing the impact telegraphy had on national politics in Qing dynasty with that of the Internet, he 
focuses on the progress creating a new public sphere – a sphere under refined control – for rational discussion. 
52 Zhou Yongming, Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China 
(Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2005), 179. 
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pseudo image and to divert public attention, which has resulted in pervasive public 
distrust. According to him, this distrust in institutions and communities makes it a 
challenge to get people to collaborate outside the family. But he finds that the 
economic liberalization, social structure transformation and mass media marketization 
have changed the role of media in civil society. This is especially so, considering that 
the Internet is “an empowering tool for Chinese civil society” by creating a 
brand-new social space for civic life.  
 
Additionally, according to Zheng, in an authoritarian society that lacks the rule of law 
and well-established institutions, and where citizens are pressed by intense state 
control, the Internet is the mediator between state and society. It is the crux for 
creating and maintaining social cohesion and institutional success. In China, 
Political reform was to be initiated from the top and managed by the 
leadership. Leadership somehow encouraged social groups to 
engage in heated debates about political reform, but it did not allow 
social discourse on political reform to become a public discourse, let 
alone to affect the leadership’s decision making.53 
The Internet has provided “the agent and the platform” for the citizens to “voice their 
grievances” and “transform grievances into collection”, especially for these lacking 
alternative strategies. Historically, the accumulation of social capital in China has 
encountered various political barriers, especially that from state power, although 
Chinese society has cultivated many aspiring intellectuals and diverse social 
organizations. 
 
                                                        
53 Zheng Yongnian, Technological empowerment: the Internet, state and society in China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2007), 25. 
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People may wonder why decentralization is so important. One answer is that political 
decentralization caused by socioeconomic changes, one of which is the marketization 
of mass media, “have provided a fertile ground for many voluntary, informal mass 
organizations, which are originally intended to fill the void of the social functions of 
work units and government-sanctioned organizations”54. The emergence of informal 
organizations is likely to transform resource distribution between social actors.55 To 
be more accurate, some people may gain access to, while others lose control over, 
certain resources; thereafter, the usage of particular resources for a given purpose will 
also be changed. As a result, there is no resource monopoly and authoritarian system.  
 
2.3.2 Rebuilding Social Relations Through CMC 
The redistribution of social resources, as a result or the manifestation of political 
decentralization, tends to change the structure and content of social relations among 
users. Structurally, the digital divide based on education, knowledge and social 
awareness could change homophilous social networks to heterophilous ones, and vice 
versa: people with similar power positions may differ in social knowledge.56 Besides, 
being a member of a certain virtual community sometimes helps someone to build a 
weak connection, for instance, a lurker could become familiar with people whose 
posts he always views. Moreover, online relations could dislocate offline hierarchies. 
                                                        
54 Chen Jie and Lu Chunlong, “Social Capital in Urban China: Attitudinal and Behavioral Effects on Grassroots 
Self-Government” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 
31, Philadelphia, USA, 2006), 6. 
55 Resource such as social status is a crucial factor in civic engagement. By assessing materials on how people 
from different families wish others happy new year, Bian Yanjie makes the statement that everyone tends to do 
that to people from the same social class. By interpreting the empirical data from a survey of urban population’s 
social networks, Zhang emphasizes the importance of social status in urban China. 
56 Kalathil, 2003. 
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In cyber-networks, the hierarchical relationships are not as powerful as before, since 
online activism is growing at such a high rate that the government can no longer 
dominate in state-society communication and interaction.  
 
Meanwhile, the basis or the content of these relations are also undergoing 
transformation. As mentioned, the flourishing of ICTs increases public distrust in 
governments and institutions, because of the increasing exposure of institutional 
scandals, especially that of corruption. In fact, this increasing distrust is not caused by 
CMC, but by institutional inefficiency, inequality and governmental corruption, 
where CMC can serve as the palliative albeit at an incipient stage. In practice, this 
distrust could be a driving force for an institutional revolution under the 
circumstances of weak institutions and deficient civic culture.  
 
CMC in China emerged along with “Chinese modernity”, one instant consequence of 
which is identity crises. This identity crisis in China has much to do with state 
nationalism, used by the state to maintain the society’s obedience to institutions and 
government policies.57 During the demonstrations against America in 1999, Japanese 
businesses in 2005, and the boycott of French products in 2008, the Chinese people 
                                                        
57 There are mainly two types of nationalism in recent China, both promoters of costly and uncontrollable 
collective actions. One is anti-West sentiment, and the other is anti-Japanese nationalism, both of which are deeply 
rooted in historical resentment since the first Opium War in 1840. In the first category, the major motivator is the 
imagined or real humiliation from the West. For instance, the nationwide indignation and self-organized 
demonstration against America’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May 8, 1999. Recently, the 
criticism of Western prejudice and unfair reports on anti-government protests in Tibet during the 2008 Olympic 
Torch Relay also caused particular ire in China, as did the nationwide boycott of French product because of the 
obstruction encountered in Paris. To the second, the national demonstration against Japanese business in many 
cities broke out in 2005, as a result of Chinese people’s anger over Japan’s negation of wartime crimes, the annual 
pilgrimages of Japanese prime minister to Yasukuni Shrine in commemorating the criminals of World War II, and 
the falsification in Japan of its history textbooks. 
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shared a high degree of social identity and connectedness. For years, this type of 
commitment to a specific political authority underlined the sense of belonging to a 
sovereign entity, but undermined the sense of citizenship. Thus, stressing on 
individual creativity and freedom, “online activism is thus also an identity movement, 
expressed as yearnings and struggles for social recognition, personal dignity, and a 
sense of community”58. From experiences online, Chinese citizens are now extremely 
eager to communicate with their fellow countrymen to rebuild their social identity. 
 
2.3.3 Mobilizing Collective Actions Through CMC 
This part is devoted to how mobilization starts and ends in authoritarian regimes, the 
process of which turns CMC into political communication. Zheng discusses how 
interaction strategies matter in carrying out Internet-based collective actions, 
following Hirschmans’ categorization of Internet activities into “exit”, “voice”, and 
“loyalty”59, and finds “the ‘voice’ acceptable to both the state and society”60. Simply 
put, it is because in authoritarian China, any collective action beyond state control is 
unlikely to succeed.61 Clearly, this approach focuses on the power of CMC in 
response to state manipulation. However, there are occasions when state organizations 
are not the principal driving force in collective action for common interests. Hence, 
                                                        
58 Yang, 2009, 218. 
59 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to decline in Firms, organizations, and State 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
60 Zheng, 2007, 165. 
61  Zheng claims that “Due to the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system, whether a given	  
Internet-based social movement will succeed or not is largely dependent on how the state views that social 
movement”, in Technological Empowerment, p136. The associational landscape in pre-Internet China also 
suggests that only associations supportive of the authoritarian regime and in line with state stance can exist and 
gain official support. Others in opposition to regime authority will only suffer from stringent control. The 
development of informal organizations in China is still rigorously manipulated by the state. But CMC at least 
provides citizens the opportunity with which to access resources and form relationships. 
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alternatives stem from Internet businesses and community members’ utopian impulse: 
two aspects of Yang’s multi-interactionism. 
 
For Yang, the logic of running Internet businesses is based on “web traffic” and 
“contentious activities” which implicates the synergy between online activism and 
Internet business. 62  Adopting market strategies to achieve collective interests 
therefore imputes Internet business a social character. In other words, the practices of 
media commercialization, aiming at burgeoning virtual communities and gaining 
economic interests, are actually a form of social production, which “also challenge the 
logic market and proprietary market-centered economic production”63. Hitherto, the 
economic traits of CMC can also help promote collective actions. Subsequently, Yang 
studies the historical development, participants’ imagination and feeling of CMC. He 
concludes that although having emerged due to people’s desire for connection, CMC 
affords people an approach through which they also attempt to put collectively 
imaged new values into practice.64 However, similar to other pieces, discussions 
about CMC in China have focused on NGOs or informal associations.65  
  
Virtual community, as one form of online existence, shares the social features of both 
community and CMC, marking an adaptation in civic engagement to fit the changing 
                                                        
62 Yang, 2009, 15. 
63 Yang, 2009, 124. 
64 Ibid, 184. But he does not discuss the complex relationships formed among community members. CMC, as 
defined, can only take place between two or more members, but cannot exert power on the social landscape 
without the relational facet. 
65 It is true that the Internet offers traditional NGOs new opportunities to expand their scope and strengthen their 
influences; some virtual communities have also set up their own civic associations. But this is not the primary 
focus of this new media in transforming social landscape in contemporary China. 
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participatory demands. Although Liu has done an ethnographic study on the Tianya 
Community — the participants, community rules, online activities and emotional 
feelings after participation66 — as Yang and many other Chinese scholars have 
commented, “her analysis focuses purely on the internal feature of online 
communities without linking them to the broader social context”, which makes her 
book merely a guidebook to Tianya. How the formation of social capital takes place 
on account of virtual discourses is still ambiguous. 
 
2.4  The Theoretical Framework of Mechanisms  
Based on the above analyses, this section claims with confidence that the ability of 
CMC to decentralize political power in resource distribution, to falter in both the 
physical and relational boundaries, and to lubricate the achievement of shared goals, 
provides impetus to social capital formation. Three hypotheses can be generalized: (1) 
resources are redistributed through CMC as a result of power decentralization; (2) 
individuals’ use of these redistributed resources affects social relations and values; 
and (3) resources embedded in social relations sharing certain values can be 
mobilized for action.67  
 
Firstly, CMC in virtual communities such as Tianya incorporates a process of 
decentralization, presenting unprecedented convenience, flexibility, profundity, and 
                                                        
66 Liu Jun, “A Holistic Network Approach to the Study of the Social Support Network in Village Fa-The 
Blockmodel and Its Application”, She Hui (Society) 3, 26 (2005): 69-80. 
67 It is based on Lin’s theoretical framework and meticulous exposition in understanding how cybernetworks help 
to “recruit, train, retain, and mobilize followers and create collective social capital”, e.g., China’s “Falun Gong” 
social movement. 
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openness in common parlance. But it cannot be superficially read as necessarily 
leading to the downfall of this authoritarian regime. Instead, this decentralization does 
not preclude the possibility of manipulation, which is perhaps ingrained in Chinese 
culture. Thus, it is important also to know the extent to which resource distribution is 
decentralized and the probable confines to individuals’ accessing of social resources.  
 
To articulate the process in detail, collective usage of resources is divided into two 
types: the creation of new resources, and the employment of existing resources. In 
creation, a subconscious cognition of viewing oneself as a member of the community 
gives impetus to the formation of networks. For the government, active involvement 
in online activities should be the foci of their effort for economic benefit and social 
support. In the work sphere, getting an overview of what is going on in the country or 
around the world, and keeping abreast of the times, are the main purposes. It is 
indispensible in network building and may have significant spillover effects in real 
life. In terms of the amount of effort one might put into, and the position one might 
set in the flow chain, in real life, the use of resources could be considered along a 
continuum. At both ends of the continuum are creation and employment of resources 
respectively.  
 
The second aspect is about what happened to social relations as a result of resource 
redistribution. With the transformation of political system, the dying of collectivism 
(ji ti zhu yi), and the flourishing of western liberalism, Chinese people are now 
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experiencing an identity crisis and CMC thus becomes inevitable in causing a revival 
of individualism.68 Although a debate exists as to whether the state should supervise 
individuals’ activities for the sake of the collectivity, individualism is perceived to 
protect individual liberty and creativity. In practice, Tianya is inclusive to Chinese 
citizens. And the principle — that the resources available for individuals in virtual 
communities to interact with others will not decrease — sustains this inclusiveness. 
This is also reflected in the forum’s tolerance to netizens’ creative ways of 
involvement, including culture jamming (e gao).69 
 
But individualism does not mean doing things on one’s own. Instead, the advantage 
of community interaction is that it provides collective goods that individuals cannot 
provide for themselves. Emancipated from physical identity and given the 
opportunities to create individuality, people also become uncertain of the social 
environment surrounding them. Thus, they will try to find some relationship to escape 
the isolation. Any individualized person would not commit himself to a particular 
group or choose to abide by the group’s rules if being in that group does not offer 
them more benefit than acting alone. Likewise, a group would not form if it could do 
nothing more than what individuals are likely to achieve on their own. In short, it is 
                                                        
68 Civic education in China after 1949 emphasized that individualism is a bad thing. Especially after the 
“Anti-rightist Campaign” in 1957, Zhou Yang, the head of Literary and Art Circles, said, “In the socialist society, 
individualism is the root of evil”. In the long run, an ingrained “subject” culture has quenched the development of 
citizenship and civic awareness. 
69 “Culture jamming sometimes entails transforming mass media to produce ironic or satirical commentary about 
itself, using the original medium's communication method. Culture jamming is usually employed in opposition to 
a perceived appropriation of public space, or as a reaction against social conformity.” Accessed February 1, 2011. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_jamming. In China, there is an increasing popularity of texts, music, videos 
sharing the features of e gao, most of which are just free and for fun. One example is the video named “The 
Bloody Case that Started from a Steamed Bun” made by a 31-year-old engineer Hu Ge, to satirize a widely known 
Chinese movie The Promise produced by illustrious director Chen Kaige. Hu Ge said that he made this video to 
express his dissatisfaction with the original movie, and not for any ambitious reason.  
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true that citizens have become more isolated recently because of economic, especially 
technological development, and yet at the same time, they have become more 
connected to each other. 
 
The underlying relations are categorized into two types based on the structures: 
homophilous and heterophilous. Simply put, homophilus can be manifested by the 
relationships within non-activists and activists; while hterophilous can be manifested 
by the relationships between non-activists and activists. In practice, online activists 
always struggle to resist the preexisting ideological control designed by the 
government.70 For ordinary citizens, therefore, the relationships or contacts with 
these activists can be very beneficial. It is the articulation of the Chinese people’s new 
identity and social networks. Without specific institutions, rules or organizations, the 
mobilization for collective action through CMC relies heavily on these activists, 
particularly the innovative methods they use to fight an increasing level of censorship.  
 
Thirdly, different social actors’ use of resources embedded in both homophilous and 
heterophilous relations appreciate distinctive ways of mobilization. Compared to 
traditional mobilization for participation in election, meeting and decision-making, 
virtual mobilization costs less and is difficult to cover up. Anyone may choose to 
participate freely, without worrying about being finger-pointed or blamed by others. 
                                                        
70 CMC gave rise to a “new opinion stratum” as Zhou Ruijin – a well-known political commentator and former 
deputy chief editor of the People's Daily – proposed in early 2009. In “Glad to See the Rise of ‘New Opinion 
Stratum’”. Online at http://epaper.oeeee.com/A/html/2009-01/02/content_675368.htm. Accessed October 26, 
2010. 
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The anonymity helps liberate individuals from their social labels and social 
responsibility.71 The emphasis on individualism also provides a good excuse to be 
away from collective actions that are more likely to destroy this limited safety.  
 
But CMC on certain topics is also characterized by its rapidity in fading from both 
internal (such as a decline in discussion enthusiasm) and external factors. Therefore, 
most ordinary netizens need a reason or motivation initially to participate, and 
subsequently to maintain their passion. In detail, online mobilization through 
dispersive networks can be achieved by three elements: collective identity, group 
leadership and social environment. Each element works for particular purposes but 
does not overstep the pursuit of profits: netizens’ aggregate participation to gain 
recognition, reputation and connectedness; businesses’ promotion for economic profit 
and popularity; and the government’s intervention to assimilate new social groups 
into its political system and enhance its political legitimacy. These ambitions and 
behaviors mobilize actors with weak or strong ties to participate in the same issue.  
 
The aforementioned three aspects are the main mechanisms in this paper that are 
tested in Chapter 4 based on empirical qualitative data. For purposes of this paper, the 
social capital formed through CMC depends, not on any one of the three patterns, but 
on the equilibrium among them. Chapter 3 depicts a “concrete” community — Tianya, 
its financial support, technological structure, software design, participants, 
                                                        
71 Theoretical and empirical evidences suggest that the anonymity of online participation actually decreases 
participants’ sense of belonging to a group of community, and leads to a more isolated end. 
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community law and rules, and participatory purposes. From the above analyses, it is 
clear that a virtual community functions similar to a communication model, supported 
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Chapter 3 
Tianya Virtual Community 
 
In March 1999, Tianya was set up in Hainan province — a remote corner of China, 
far from Beijing — catalyzed by the Chinese people’s strong indignation at the 
U.S.-led NATO’s barbaric attack on the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. Today, 
Tianya remains one of the most popular (out of thousands of online forums) for its 
down-to-earth style, humane environment, and inclusiveness.72 It has attracted more 
than 43 million registered members,73 and is becoming an online home for Chinese 
all over the world as originally designed in the slogan “A bosom friend afar brings a 
distant land near”. The introduction of Tianya boldly states: 
At present, Tianya covers more than 100 million users of quality 
monthly and have about 32 million registered users. Tens of 
millions of user groups of high quality and loyalty produce super 
popularity, cultural experiences and interactive original content. It 
positions netizens at the center, and tries the best to satisfy multiple 
demands such as personal communication, expression and creation. 
As a result, it forms both online and offline trust and interactive 
culture among worldwide Chinese, and becomes the leading focal 
platform of Internet issues and personages in the Mandarin Circle.74  
 
Tianya was founded with the intention of building trust and a close relationship 
among geographically distant individuals and groups. As a Tianyaer with a 10-year 
experience said: 
                                                        
72 According to Alexa Internet, Tianya is currently the 15th most visited site in China and the 95th worldwide. 
73 This numbers is about half of the population of China’s most populous province Henan. According to the latest 
National Population Census of China in 2000, the most populous province is Heinan, with a population of more 
than 96 million. Tianya’s population increases by 11780 everyday, online at http://www.tianya.cn/, accessed May 
14 to October 10, 2010. 
74 Online at http://help.tianya.cn/about/about.html. Accessed August 27, 2010. 
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Although some fellow Tianyaers disappointed or even made use of 
me, which directly led to my inactivity in that sub-community, I did 
not leave Tianya. Because of its humanity and my strong sense of 
belonging, I find it hard for me to live without it. None of other 
virtual communities in China can satisfy me. Recently, I have been 
trying to get involved in another sub-community of Tianya.  
 
During its 11-year evolution, Tianya’s financial support, structure, basic rules, 
participants and community tenets have changed tremendously, which may have 
played a part in continuous social transformation. Understanding changes in 
technology and community building can contribute much to the analysis of social 
capital constructing, which is produced by these changes. This could explain Tianya’s 
success in the virtual world despite its transient population. 
 
3.1  Financial Support for Tianya 
To an enormous extent, the source of financial support always determines the political 
feature of an organization, especially a typical Chinese virtual community that 
requires a huge sum of money to sustain itself.75 The outstanding feature of Tianya’s 
economic foundation is its independence from government support and necessitated 
by the free market economy. In 1999, three individuals, including the present CEO 
(Xing Ming), invested twenty millions Chinese yuan in Tianya Virtual Community. 
In 2001, the two other individuals withdrew their investment, after which Xing Ming 
continued to operate the company alone, using money made from the stock market. 
From 2001 to 2004, because of a lackluster Internet economy and regional limitations, 
                                                        
75 The dependence of NGOs on the government financial support in China determines their political dependence 
on the government, or their irresistibility to government manipulation. 
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Tianya Virtual Community was virtually shelved and Xing himself thought of 
quitting.76 Surprisingly, the humanistic environment and freedom which participants 
enjoyed from Tianya helped it to regain ground and gave Xing the impetus to 
continue.    
 
Since 2004, venture capital has increased drastically to support Tianya’s development. 
Unlike other commercial websites or virtual communities, advertisement investment 
in Tianya turned to failure. As many Tianyers said, they were attracted to Tianya 
because of its plain layout and pure communication environment with minimal 
advertisements. Its community finance now relies mainly on personal value-added 
services, supplemented by advertisement. That could explain why this community is 
user-friendly and enjoys a relatively higher level of speech freedom and public 
popularity.  
 
3.2  The Structure of Tianya 
As discussed in Chapter 2, community size will affect participants’ activities and even 
determine the success or failure of the community. As it develops, Tianya continues 
to develop diverse sub-communities, which is further categorized; unfortunately, this 
convenience and humanity becomes a problem. Generally, the management decided 
on 10 sub-communities in terms of community functions, individual interests and 
technological differences (see Table 3.1). Measured by the number of posts, degree of 
                                                        
76 As Xing Ming said, there were only three employees during that period. 
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interactivity and popularity, the hottest sub-community is Tianya Forum, which has 
10 columns. The main column is called “Tianya Zhuban” (Tianya main column), 
which includes about 70 sub-columns covering multifarious topics on economic 
development, literature writing, traveling, legal advice, cuisines, sports, entertainment 
and so on, to satisfy netizens’ daily requirement. The most popular column is “Tianya 
Zatan”, which has no specific focus.77 
 
Table 3.1 The Structure of Tianya Community 
Sections Columns Theme and main activities 
Forum Main column Issues such as social news, economy, photography, 
gossip, love, and so on. 
Cities Divided into 35 columns based on China’s real 
administrative division: 24 provinces, four 
municipalities, five autonomous regions and two 
special administrative regions. 
Traveling Food, transportation, scenery, culture, living habit 
and so on, in places where people travel.  
Professionals Information about different kinds of jobs, salary 
requirements, dilemmas, relationships, etc. 
University 
life 
Studying, living and love in the universities, youth 
literature, campus songs and other memories. 
Overseas Living in other countries, mostly about love, 
education, work, family, etc. 
Backyard Diverse ways of recreation and entertainment such 
as Story Solitaire, enjoy music, etc. 
Online stories Amateur writers share their work with other 
netizens.  
Brand life Famous brands of clothes, shoes, hotels, cosmetics. 
Blog  A sub-community for people to share personal 
feelings and perspectives in the form of blogs. 
Lai Bar  A social networking point for the fashionable men 
and women. 
Q&A  A place to ask questions or to provide answers. 
Games  Personal experience playing games. 
                                                        
77 The popularity is determined by the number of posts, clicking frequency, public’s attention, etc. Online at 
http://www.tianya.cn/bbs/index.shtml, accessed March 25, 2010. 
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Brands  Companies publicizing famous brands. 
Shopping  Information on discounts or promotions for all 
kinds of products. 
Photo 
album 
 Sharing pictures with fellow netizens, participating 
in online photographing competition. 
Music  Recommending others’ or sharing self-made music. 
Classified 
info. 
 Communication with others about things people see 
in their daily lives. 
Pocket 
Tianya 
 Information on using cell phones to access Tianya. 
 
As a convergence of non-kin social networks, CMC in Tianya Zatan is able to build 
connections among people with shared interests or perspectives. Married persons tend 
to gravitate to similar others to discuss marriage, their husbands/wives and children. 
They are more likely to criticize or take collective actions, for example, against 
companies selling inferior milk powder and hospitals using unqualified medicines for 
children. Forming connections may not have been the original purpose in establishing 
Tianya, but this has turned out to be the most significant consequence. It is logical to 
assume that the more diverse the means of CMC, the more likely one is able to build 
social ties. Table 3.1 provides a collection of ways for communication, including text, 
image, video and many other uses of software. Admittedly, not everyone welcomes 
this categorization, as can be seen in the number of supporters and critics. Each 
sub-community has developed its own specific atmosphere and internal small circles.  
 
3.3 Participants 
As the fundamental and outstanding characteristics of online text, decentrality does 
not mean fully horizontal relations and equal positions. In fact, text itself is static and 
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discursive without subjective ambitions. That is exactly where the subject — netizens 
— can play a role. People are the pulse of the community in providing peer-to-peer 
interaction and activating static resources. Once the identities of these participants are 
considered, it is inevitable that the stratification of human beings in social structure 
will have certain reflections in Tianya. Taking into account the features of community 
power and responsibility, this paper categorizes Tianyaers into three groups: (1) 
moderators (ban zhu), (2) active participants (huoyue fenzi), and (3) ordinary 
members and lurkers. But it should be cautioned that there is no clear-cut boundary 
between these three groups. The company assigns a web master (zhan zhang) to take 
charge of the community. This paper does not examine the web master’s role, as s/he 
rarely gets involved in online conversations.  
 
3.3.1 Moderator (ban zhu) 
There are many ways in which individuals could become a moderator: they could be 
elected by ordinary members, nominated by ordinary members but decided on by the 
webmaster, invited by the community from external resources, assigned by the 
holding company, or even specifically named by the government. Thus, the identity 
of these moderators could be ordinary netizens, company employees, or government 
officials. 78  This constitution paves the way for resource exchange and 
cyber-hierarchy formation. 
                                                        
78 The participation of government officials in online conversations is particularly important to ensure resource 
and position diversity. Many government officials I interviewed admitted that online public opinions had already 
become one of the most important channels for them to make decisions on public policies and direct 
communication with non-officials turned out to be beneficial for mutual understanding. 
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Moderators have a greater responsibility than ordinary members, while enjoying more 
freedom and “rights” in some aspects, with changes as the community develops. 
Accordingly, moderators may choose whether to participate, their primary role being 
to read others’ posts to ensure appropriateness; to delete posts, block IDs or even shut 
down sub-communities when necessary; but they have to take care when responding 
to complaints and accusations. In a word, responsibility and rights are relative： 
We moderators have to behave more neutrally, controlling personal 
emotions and avoiding being extremists. Most thorny is how to trade 
off between publicity and community development since the two are 
occasionally contradictory. (Interviewee 2) 
 
The moderators I interviewed perceive themselves as mediators between the central 
authority and the public, being partners, rather than opponents, to both. In this sense, 
moderators rank higher in community power and closer to better resources than 
ordinary participants; to some extent, they tend to be higher in heterophilous social 
networks. In this case, moderators always impose self-censorship for political 
leverage: getting support from, or at least not being punished by, the state, at the same 
time pushing social issues further up or down the agenda. Without them, Tianya will 
run into chaos immediately.  
 
Being a moderator is sometimes boring, unrewarding and troublesome, yet it requires 
great enthusiasm and skill. To safeguard a healthy and vibrant environment, 
moderators should know how to prevent flaming and spam, to control potentially 
libelous, radical and provocative conversations within a certain limit, to answer FAQs 
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(Frequently Asked Questions) concerning software or content, and help ordinary 
people to disseminate news when necessary. More specifically, in order to create or 
maintain the popularity of the not-so-active columns, moderators are required to 
generate topics, lead discussions and invigorate the interaction; while in the 
exceedingly active ones, they should strive to keep discussions relevant and orderly, 
using specific pieces of software and management skills. To keep Tianya away from 
the danger of being shut down by the government for politically subversive 
conversations, moderators should keep a close eye on all posts and learn to effectively 
use the filtering system.  
 
3.3.2 Active Participants (huoyue fenzi) 
Internet activists, including professionals, scholars, media workers, writers, artists and 
well-educated freelancers, comprise the all-important part of the online intellectual 
community. This group has extensive knowledge on a multitude of social issues, and 
can analyze from multifarious angles. Features to distinguish online activists from 
non-activists include the number of posts, virtual scores, participating frequencies, 
number of followers and political awareness. Although many community members 
have utilized the community to solve all kinds of problems, a substantial number of 
participants, especially these activists, engaged to change things, in Tianya or even 
the whole Chinese society. They use invisible “pens” — keyboard and mouse — to 
gain power and respect, although not powerful enough as offline activists. Compared 
to moderators, activists are ordinary netizens beyond the control of the media 
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company, thus they are not required to make neutral comments and monitor online 
behavior; compared to ordinary members, they are able to form tenuous but 
uncontrollable online alliances with their fellows. 
 
They could be ordinary people (for instance, businessman, high school teachers, 
freelancers) or in high positions in the political hierarchy (for instance, police 
inspectors). While those in positions have more access to social resources to engage 
in online activities, their cyber-power and reputation is based on their contributions to 
the community, such as any help they provide to increase public security. This is the 
distinction between moderators and online activists, in terms of cyber-hierarchy. 
 
The principle that responsibility and rights are relative also holds true here. Compared 
to ordinary members, activists have to be more careful in their daily operations. 
Voicing personal opinions on social issues in virtual communities is a private 
business but highly related to and strictly monitored by the public. The willingness to 
take responsibility in personal behaviors online, in most circumstances, makes 
activists more popular and trustworthy. Eventually, they are likely to be chosen as 
leaders of certain Internet-initiated collective actions, which then generates them 
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3.3.3 Ordinary Members and Lurkers 
It seems that, compared to the above two high-status groups, ordinary members have 
much less power and influence in Tianya. They log in or click on the link of Tianya 
once a week, month or even a year, as they wish. They may be long-time observers or 
bystanders, newbies watching from the sideline, or former activists that have “retired” 
because of unpleasant experiences. But their potential influence should not be 
underestimated, especially in the event of emergencies. For instance, according to 
official reports, the Sichuan earthquake occurred on May 12, 2008 at 2:20 p.m. The 
first post informing about the earthquake was made by an ordinary netizen at 2:30 
p.m.; as the poster said, the post was made at 2:29 p.m. but was initially rejected 
without being categorized by the type of post.79 Immediately after that, people 
throughout China and around the world got to know about the disaster, began to 
collect information online or through real-life channels, called their families and 
friends, posted updates, wrote to pray for the victims, and even went to the disaster 
site to help in the search and rescue. The country was shocked by the event, and 
reports on it pervaded the entire world.  
 
Beyond government efforts, numerous posts calling for volunteers to organize rescue 
teams and go to quake-ravaged areas to help Sichuan people also emerged throughout 
Tianya. It was the mass effort in spreading resources that made nationwide or even 
worldwide awareness and participation possible. Although many requests had not 
                                                        
79 “Serious Earthquake!!!”. Online at http://www.xcar.com.cn/bbs/viewthread.php?tid=7554567&extra=&page=1. 
Accessed March 3, 2010. 
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been converted to action, their effort was still considered great progress in the history 
of human coordination. Many netizens went offline and cooperated with strangers to 
help the victims. Being activist or not was no longer their consideration. 
 
The spillover effect of these netizens’ participation to real life was unpredictable, 
which is also possible for the other two groups of participants. Ordinary members of 
Tianya may be active participants in another virtual community or real-life social 
circles. Their sharing of resource, obtained from Tianya, when acting as lurkers or 
normal netizens might be efficacious in their social networks outside Tianya. In return, 
that could result in an increase in the lurkers’ confidence and their friends’ interest in 
Tianya. A simple example is from a Tai Chi enthusiast’s experience: 
I posted my cell phone number in my posts discussing the skills and 
benefits of Tai Chi, and a great number of Tianyers communicated 
with me in my post and someone even contacted me via cell phone 
or video. Most of them I knew before because we talked a lot in my 
post. But the interesting thing is that several of them are total 
strangers that I have never seen and talked online. But I don’t know, 
and don’t care. 
 
3.4  Software 
Software is the technological basis of CMC and participants’ digital skills. 
Knowledge of software and the ability to use it determines, to some degree, who are 
the participants, the depth of their interaction, to what extent their lives will be 
affected, and what and how they can contribute to the community. Practical 
experience explains that some people leave the community because of their inability 
to use some basic software smoothly. In Tianya Zatan, a text-based forum, software 
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requirement is not rigid, and people with basic knowledge about computers and 
typing can use it. 
 
For ordinary Tianyaers, the importance of software lies in its ability to facilitate their 
online behavior, especially to participate in designing and improving Tianya. As for 
moderators, it touches on more aspects: (1) attract certain groups of people, and keep 
others out of the door — forbid their registrations or block their existing IDs — such 
as the virtual reputation indicators through the system of rewards and punishment; (2) 
reduce moderators’ administrative burden, for instance, by distinguishing new posts 
from old ones by colors or flags attached to posts; and (3) help moderators to conform 
to government censorship, for example, the software filtering sensitive and offensive 
words and phrases. 
 
Although far from perfect, software in Tianya with the above features has constructed 
its material infrastructure, and is welcomed by Chinese netizens. As one interviewee 
noted, after comparing hundreds of communities, the layout and simplicity of these 
applications made him decide to stay. However, to enthrall participants, to promote 
and sustain involvement, the community’s purposes, content, rules and many other 
substantial aspects are still the foundations. The virtual community of the future will 
depend not just on how the technology or the software produced by it evolves, but 
also on how participants learn and use their knowledge to improve and reinvent 
community software or its technological structure.  
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3.5  Community Law and Rules 
As with institutions and laws within a nation, there are rules and law in Tianya. The 
community also needs these to manage participants’ behavior, participants need them 
to decide what they can and cannot do, and the state needs them to regulate the 
community and participants, so as to preserve state power and social stability. 
Netizens’ behavior is restrained by these rules and law from the very beginning to the 
end of their cyber-lives. Tianya has its common rules as with other communities, and 
every column has its own specific rules, which determine political opportunities and 
constraints of resource exchange and network building. These rules are interpreted via 
three aspects: registration and management, security and intellectual property, and 
netiquette.  
 
Official rules of ID registration and management in Tianya were launched late in June 
2000. Without registering as members, individuals are only allowed to read posts as a 
guest in Tianya, which would satisfy a portion of participants. Registration is required 
for those that want to post. Tianya can remove a member’s ID if s/he does not post 
with his ID and logs in less than five times within a three-month period following 
registration. This is to encourage participation by registered members. Aside from 
violating community rules, conditions under which IDs can be removed include: (1) 
when one’s behavior violates national law and regulations; (2) when one attacks, 
humiliates, or provokes others deliberately; or (3) when one registers under a name of 
an influential social figure.  
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As the community develops and the number of community members increases, the 
management and controls also tighten, including new rules like the post review 
system. The relatively free CMC in Tianya is thus gradually formalized. However, 
almost all the interviewees said they paid little attention to these general rules at the 
time of registration with Tianya. This could, however, be a crucial factor in 
generating conflicts among participants. 
 
Although set up for non-commercial purposes, Tianya as a business entity should 
follow the market principles to survive or use these principles for its own purposes in 
this marketization era. In this aspect, rules are mainly for the participants’ security 
and intellectual property purposes. For instance, copyright protection rules (CPRs) are 
paramount, since CMC is mostly cherished for the content that is easy to be copied, 
especially in a country lacking law protecting intellectual property rights. Especially 
for web writers, CPRs are the essentials of their virtual living.  
 
Sub-communities have their own specific rules, which should be obeyed by ordinary 
members as well as moderators. Different from general rules, these specific ones are 
always cautiously obeyed by participants, otherwise the moderators or ordinary 
members have the option to censure. One moderator in the column “China Academy” 
was forced to leave for his violation of the specific rule: maintaining the neutrality of 
academic research. As explained by another moderator: 
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That moderator once copied a political post about Liu Kaibo, which 
triggered keen discussion in the column. The focus of the discussion 
is whether academic posts in our column should be politically 
neutral with no exception, and whether that moderator’s behavior 
should be punished. Ultimately, he resigned.80 (Interviewee 5) 
 
3.6  Community Purpose: A Participatory Design 
One assumption for the legitimization of a virtual community or even the macro-level 
political system is that most members participate in civic activities. The community 
employs various strategies to encourage them to become involved. What the 
community projects outwardly thus determines who the members are, and what they 
can achieve. For Tianya, participatory design is seen as central to its development in 
fostering social integration. Its development is therefore both the means and the end. 
However, no matter what the community plans to realize, it ultimately depends on the 
participants. In this sense, addressing community-participants’ interaction matters 
most in the community’s social construction. 
 
Tianya is doing well in being inclusive to the majority of the Chinese people, 
economically, politically and socially. On one hand, it is through the daily operations 
that people learn the spirit of cooperation, both consciously and subconsciously. It is 
impossible for people to take action by carefully calculating the costs and benefits all 
the time. Therefore, cooperation should not always be explained in terms of 
rationality. Everyone can share their opinions without worrying about his/her 
appearance and social labels. Even a former criminal would not be discriminated 
                                                        
80 Online at http://www4.tianya.cn/new/techforum/content.asp?iditem=666&idarticle=7326, Accessed October 12, 
2010. 
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against, which is impossible in real-life communities. Thus, a strong sense of 
belonging in Tianya is understandable, especially in authoritarian China where the 
state has policed civic activities stringently since its onset.  
 
At the community level, sub-communities in Tianya are divided on the basis of 
participants’ age, gender, interest, and geographical position, between which no 
clear-cut boundary exists. It can therefore be read as participants’ indirect 
involvement in community building. Although some discussions also show the dark 
side of CMC, such as speaking based on hearsay evidence and blindly following 
trends, the general trend of discussion is not merely noise or sentimental twaddle, 
leading to meaningless chaos as perceived. Rather, venting online is easy to attract 
similar moods and aggregate each other’s ill humor because misery seeks company. 
Living in an environment greatly based on the market economy but with relatively 
weak religiosity, the Chinese have become vulnerable to the feelings of loneliness and 
selfishness. Online communities, then, emerge as places where participants can find 
themselves a role in society and acquire the feeling of inclusion they desire.81 
 
More directly, Tianya establishes several other policies or measures for its 
sustainability. For instance, Guantian Teahouse launched an election of the 
Arbitration Committee on March 26, 2004, to decide committee members. In 
February 2006, it even made a significant political-related progress — “public 
                                                        
81 Schutz, William, The Interpersonal Underworld (Palo Alto, CA: Science & Behavior books, 1966). 
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nomination and election” of moderators. After that, another sub-community began to 
reorganize itself by encouraging all netizens to nominate candidates. But it turned out 
to be a public criticism of current moderators on their alleged malfeasance, personal 
morality and so on. Because of these efforts, Tianya became well known. 
Subsequently, famous Chinese writers accepted interview requests from Tianya, and 
jurists began to post articles in Tianya to expose real-life judicial scandals. 
 
In this way, resources are redistributed and opportunities are offered to Tianyaers for 
engagement, whether observing as third parties, public posting and discussion, or 
private messaging. 82  In public communication, Tianyaers’ can: (1) Comment: 
express personal emotions and perspectives on certain issues; (2) Chat: just 
communicate with others without explicit objectives, or mainly to get rid of loneliness; 
(3) Abuse: separate oneself from a certain group, or more precisely, from the common 
identity of that group; (4) Oppose: gain recognition from his/her social circles; (5) 
Remonstrate: steadily adhere to his/her own ideas and the group identity; (6) Refuse: 
stop someone’s ascendance into power or protect one’s own rights; (7) Apply: get a 
higher position in community, such as being a moderator; (8) Consult: make clear 
about the problems one cares both online and offline; (9) Complain: against someone 
or some policies. 
 
                                                        
82 For some waverers, getting lost in Tianya will result in two directions: (1) Find their way through mutual 
empowerment; or (2) Leave it as a result of failure in accessing useful information. It depends on the attractiveness 
of community design and participants’ interest and capability. Some of these who stayed have more or less 
engagement in the community participatory design. 
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Often, conversations in the public sphere is not enough to satisfy some netizens; for 
instance, there may be important, but sensitive, information that people want to share 
with others, or someone wants to get closer to another person in private. Under these 
circumstances, private messaging is needed. For convenience, some people choose to 
exchange their QQ numbers, MSN or email addresses. When two persons or groups 
get connected privately, different levels of communication will be in the formation. 
This increases the possibility for the formation of strong ties.  
 
Being aware of the possibility of eroding face-to-face social interaction in this digital 
era, moderators and ordinary Tianyaers are now trying to get participants together in 
real life. In some situations, offline meetings or gatherings take place when CMC 
seems inadequate and people involved are really keen to discuss further about some 
issues or build friendship. Over time, interest groups are formed, shaped and 
stabilized even from dispersive discussions. During the process, one important factor 
— reciprocity — should not be ignored. Individuals may choose to take part in one 
activity or another voluntarily, strictly speaking, but may still harbor the hope of 
being repaid in all kinds of ways. This return of favor might not realize immediately, 
or may never be returned. But meanwhile, it makes people feel secure encountering 
difficulties in the indeterminate future.  
 
Participatory design, as a way to involve people in creating and sharing resources 
voluntarily with fellow citizens, was difficult to carry out if people had no close 
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hierarchical ties with high-ranking officials. In current China, although formal 
channels of citizen participation are still lacking, informal power seems to be a good 
substitute, and in fact it could exert great power. Rooted in Confucianism, legitimacy 
of leadership in this country rests upon the moral superiority of the leaders and 
consensus of the masses, rather than institutions. As a result, informal relations 
become more effective in dealing with various issues. That is why informal virtual 
behaviors can affect government agendas and social transformations. But to succeed 
or just survive in contemporary China, Tianya still needs state recognition and 
permission as well as mass support. As a burgeoning new business model, the media 
company has to pay close attention to Chinese political realities and firmly obey them, 
or at least strategically deal with them. Different communities interact with 
authoritarian tactics differently, which makes their respective development different 
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Chapter 4 
Resource Distribution and  
Relationship Building in Tianya 
 
The mechanisms of constructing social capital in Tianya are based on interplays 
among authoritarian institutions, traditional culture, and CMC. In Chapter 2, I did an 
exploratory study of CMC, addressing the detailed process of mobilizing collective 
action in theory. It highlighted the following: (1) CMC in Tianya contributes to the 
redistribution of resources to the degree of “selectivity”; (2) the redistribution of 
resources such as homophilous and heterophious networks and forms a “digital 
hierarchy” based on social knowledge, mainly by creating activist groups; (3) the 
loosely coupled heterogeneity of social networks which mobilize collective actions 
through different approaches. This chapter discusses the first two aspects, claiming 
that “what we have and do in daily life” determines, to some extent, whom we know, 
and what relationships we have with others. As it illustrates, constructing social 
capital through CMC mark a transition from a society that is unacquainted with CMC 
to one that can cooperate through it.  
 
4.1  Resource Distribution 
On February 1, 2010, Xintai government in Shandong Province published a notice, 
“Proposed Candidates of Leading Cadres in Xintai through Open Selection” on its 
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government website. 83  Someone criticized the legitimacy and equality of the 
selection publicly in a post on February 22, 2010, after which questioning and distrust 
permeated Chinese cyberspace from all quarters. By February 25, there were 72 
related posts in Tianya Zatan, all voicing doubts.84 Negative posts (or neutral at best) 
analyzing the promotion principles behind this phenomenon filled the sub-community, 
full of detailed background information about these candidates, such as their 
hometowns, official positions of their parents and relatives, social status of their 
significant others, and even their personal photos. All these information was available 
to millions of Chinese at home or abroad.85  
 
Some questions arise then: How could these Tianyers be sure that there was a 
black-box operation behind this promotion since they had never been to Xintai or met 
these candidates? What did they know about them just several days after this 
announcement? Viewing information as one special type of material resources, the 
technological power of this new media is now changing both the quantity and quality 
of resources being delivered to individuals.86 This is determined by China’s political 
reality. In China, mass media has never been an independent agency, but rather, a tool 
highly monopolized by the government to create national unity and political identity. 
                                                        
83 Online at http://www.xintai.gov.cn/contents/43/6249.html. Accessed on October 26, 2010. 
84 I searched the words “Xintai” in that sub-community on February 25, 2010 at 17:37 hours. 
85 One post titled “looking at China’s Tragedy from ‘Xintai’s Promotion of Deputy Director Born in 1980s’ ” 
attracted 6704 visits and 104 comments sharing diverse personal opinions till 23:41, 36 hours after it was posted. 
Online at http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1816452.shtml. Accessed on March 23, 2010. 
86 The most salient feature that distinguishes social resources from individual or human resources is that their 
values can only be realized through collective use. Take information as an example, without others’ making, one 
cannot get certain piece of information; without receivers’ using, evaluating and reproducing, information does not 
have any value. 
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Virtual communities are set up to satisfy mass communication87, taking mundane 
conversations as its common exemplar. In Tianya Zatan, where there are no settled 
communication agendas and schedules, it is difficult to control the origins and 
outcomes of using resources, had the government not shut down Internet access 
completely.88 In this case, the spontaneity and flexibility of CMC militates against 
dominant social structures based on centralized state power, making the free flow of 
resources more likely.  
 
Before the information era, a majority of personal social circles were confined within 
a limited scope of relatives, friends, existing predominantly in schools and 
workplaces. They communicate with a limited number of persons about a limited 
number of social issues; and their perceptions on social issues are probably misled 
because of resource shortage. However, the collective use in a virtual community 
does not require the physical presence of the sender and receiver, the disclosure of 
their identities, or the impingement of their privacy, especially in Tianya, which is 
relatively high in its level of decentrality. Moreover, one’s employment of resources 
in Tianya will not decrease the availability for others, facilitated by faster computing.  
 
Nevertheless, the decentralization is still selective in three aspects. First of all, 
                                                        
87 For instance, Tianya, one of the most popular unofficial virtual communities came into being because virtual 
mass communication was booming. Another instance, one of the most famous official communities – 
Strengthening the Nation Forum (Qiangguo Luntan) – was originally set up by People’s Daily as “BBS for strong 
protest against the atrocity of NATO” in May 9, 1999, to channel the public indignation at the U.S.-led NATO’s 
barbaric attack on the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia into online discussion.  
88 All these interviewees, both online and offline, agreed that it was not wise or practical for the government to 
shut down the entire Internet access. 
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although Tianya has earned much more independence from the government compared 
with traditional mass media and, hence, has made civic engagement more effective, it 
still cannot survive without the state’s permission. As Zheng noted: 
First, the government exercises only selective control over 
information flow; that is, it blocks only information with political 
sensitivity that can undermine regime legitimacy and is perceived as 
violating national security. Second, the government also uses 
selective penal measures to constrain those who have attempted to 
transgress the boundaries that the government has established for 
Internet users.89 
Secondly, the user ID requirement somehow prevents individuals from taking 
disruptive actions to challenge political authority, since it is closely associated with 
the member’s identity in Tianya. Thirdly, resource distribution in Tianya is, and will, 
never be totally equal. Almost all the virtual communities in China share similar rules 
telling people what they can and cannot say online, one of which is, “No speeches 
threatening national security, leaking state secrets, subverting state power and 
undermining state unity”. Moderators constantly supervise all conversations, 
according to these rules. Since these rules are mostly based on the macro-level and 
are often ambiguous, most participants cannot be totally sure what kinds of messages 
will get through community and state surveillance.  
 
Even worse, to answer, “why were so many Chinese netizens unsatisfied with this 
promotion”, I find that no matter who they are — government officials, media 
workers, cleaner, vagrants or ex-convicts — most Tianyaers share a common pursuit 
for political power. People say that some participants criticize government 
                                                        
89 Zheng, 2007, 95. 
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ill-performance, social inequalities and other social problems only because they have 
not benefitted from vested interests. Once they have accessed hierarchical power or 
resources, their online behaviors may stop. Therefore, CMC is still a way to gain 
hierarchical positions. At its foundation, everybody ends up doing the same thing, 
although not in the same way. Then, the problem becomes that the differences in 
resource usage causes resource redistribution. Through investigation, there are mainly 
two types of resource redistribution in Tianya and many other communities: the 
creation of new resources and employment of existing ones. 
 
4.1.1 Creation of New Resources 
Voluntary involvement, especially the creation of new resources, in diverse 
conversations serves as the foundation for Tianya’s success. Without contributions by 
the pioneering “netsurfers”, Tianya would not exist. As discussed in Chapter 3, the 
outstanding feature of Tianya, compared with websites focusing on instant news, is its 
high mutuality. Community members provide Tianya’s content for free, under 
moderators’ guidance and encouragement. For instance, a high school student who 
gets a competitive score in the university entrance examination shares ideas about 
best time management practices for the exam, how to be more relaxed within a 
limited time period, and tries to send or sell his notes; or an experienced nurse writes 
a list of food and drinks a patient with erosive gastritis should avoid; or a lawyer 
advertises his contact number and address to provide the poor with legal advices and 
even offers his pro bono; or a professor shares knowledge about the Chinese political 
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system and its legitimacy. In doing so, some may be aware of their agenda-setting 
influences on the community; others may not. 
 
A fundamental question arises: With partial anonymity and little charge, in addition to 
the distance from centralized control, why do so many people contribute so much to 
the community? The reasons vary. From interviews, I found that almost all active 
contributors bear explicit ambitions in their minds, including: 
To uncover social, economic, political rumors and change judicial 
injustice. 
To share life experiences and increase their personal knowledge.  
To fight against ignorance and cultivate awareness (for instance, 
ideas about religion, morality, spiritual pursuits). 
To transform interpersonal communication model (for instance, 
develop Tianya into a website able to compete with Facebook). 
To inform others about social reality (for instance, the real life of 
migrant workers in cities, the danger in using traditional Chinese 
medicine, the lives of civil servants). 
To improve academics (for instance, keep its political neutrality). 
To gain personal benefit like recognition, fame and reputation. 
 
A large proportion of the online population shares an ambition of challenging existing 
authority, shifting it from a central group of leaders to multiple groups of participants, 
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Table 4.1 Distribution of posts in three areas in Tianya Zatan90 
 
Areas  No. of posts displaying 
strong ambitions 
No. of posts lacking 
strong ambitions 
No. of posts 
eulogizing 
Economic 51 34 4 
Social 176 248 21 
Political 139 17 9 
Total no. of posts 366 299 34 
 
The determination of a post’s category is made according to whether it has directly 
mentioned the shortcomings of existing political, social, economic or cultural system 
or not. For instance, a post claiming “our culture is becoming a wasteland”, is 
categorized into the first column. An alternative explanation of Tianyaers’ cynicism, 
based on their discussion, was the illegitimacy of existing authority from inheritance 
rather through free and fair elections (or at least public approval). Under this 
circumstance, their conversations are consciously or subconsciously challenging it. 
But not all acts of resource creation are allowed or will turn out to be effective in a 
popular non-focal virtual community such as Tianya, since more influential 
communities are always more highly supervised. Moderators should investigate 
content and expressions; success requires contributors’ digital skills — both for 
effectiveness and security — which are then reinforced in return (Figure 4.1). 
                                                        
90 These posts are collected from August 19 to November 18, a total of 92 days. For eight days during this period, 
either the Internet or the Tianya Community was not accessible. Based on my methodology, collecting 10 posts 
everyday at the distance of 10 posts, 840 posts were collected. But when filling this table, I found that there were 9 
posts removed from the sub-community the entire Tianya, and 132 posts were repeated. For the final count, 
therefore, 699 posts were studied as valid. 
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Figure 4.1 Digital Skills for Effectiveness and Security 
 
There are several examples making good combination of effectiveness and security, 
as well as examples that sacrifice one for the other. Sometimes, to cater to the 
majority’s preferences and gain recognition from one’s social circle, one needs to 
behave accordingly. There are a number of “angry youths” (Fen Qing in Chinese) 
who exhibit a deep sense of hatred for the wealthy and the government officials; this 
group of netizens seems not to care about personal security. Some of them believe 
that they have nothing more to lose, they use fairly strong words, in the name of 
public equality, to criticize the people they hate. Sometimes, in order to survive 
among these angry youths, ordinary netizens have to write anti-authority posts. 
Meanwhile, to survive in an authoritarian country, one has to deal with political issues 
cautiously and make neutral and moderate comments. For rational individuals, 
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extreme thoughts separated from social reality can do nothing good to themselves in 
resolving real problems and acquiring social reputation. For the community itself, 
merely one-sided complaints keep alternative perspectives out of the door, detaching 
the community from the real world, and ultimately causing the latter’s demise. 
 
There is a trade-off between social expectation and state permission, which changes 
over time. In contemporary China, only inclusive and tolerant communities such as 
Tianya can survive and burgeon in the long run; only netizens who can smoothly 
trade off between the two are likely to gather more or better resources under state 
manipulation; or, as Tianyers say: 
Although my posts have always been obliterated, I still think I’m 
enjoying great freedom here, simply because freedom is highly 
related to wisdom rather than state prohibition. To survive here and 
also the Chinese society as a whole, I have to adjust my words 
accordingly all the time. It is not something unfair or unreasonable 
but a common challenge. I controlled or adjusted my posts to 
improve my ability in managing language. This skill is vital to my 
cyber-power in connecting with others. (Interviewee 1) 
As a leader of this sub-community, I have always been objective, 
therefore I have not been opposed massively but stay at the center of 
my network. (Interviewee 2) 
Previously, a Tianyer was arrested because of his novel about 
Dongguan (a city in Guangdong). It makes others realize that virtual 
behaviors are rigidly restricted by the reality. Thereupon, netizens 
here might pay attention to personal security in order to survive in 
the community and real life. (Interviewee 11) 
 
The most straightforward lesson from the statistical report by the Chinese Internet 
Network Information Center (CNNIC) was that many active netizens in China are 
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those with low-income, low educational level, and low social status.91 Although not 
supported by statistical data, it is seen from interviews with Tianya moderators and 
observations that Tianya (as the typical synthetic community) also shares this 
demographic. This feature could be read as a weakness or strength. On the one hand, 
CMC does not penetrate into different classes in China on an equal basis: most active 
participants are those from the lower rungs of the hierarchy, while power is still in the 
hands of the higher hierarchy. On the other hand, people from the lower ends of the 
hierarchy are participating in civic activities with greater enthusiasm that was 
unimaginable in the past. In fact, it can be said that the “underdogs” are obtaining 
social resources from the “bullies”. 
 
Another way in which resource creation enjoys both security and effectiveness 
without the cautious trading-off involves discussing apolitical issues while subtly 
redistributing social resources and challenging power authority. An example is 
ordinary netizen Zhang Xiaoyan who became famous because of her uncommon 
experience of traveling to Tibet alone with 83 Chinese yuan. Subsequently, several 
publishers contacted her to publish her story. Both material resources (money) and 
symbolic resources (fame) thus reached her and other participants: 
 
                                                        
91 According to Statistical Report on Internet Development in China (January 2010), demographic characteristics 
of Chinese Internet users are as below: the gender ration of male to female Internet users is 54.2: 45.8; the 
proportions of users aged from 10-19, 20-29, 30-39, and 40-49 are respectively 31.8%, 28.6%, 21.5% and 10.7%, 
and when compared to 2008, that of users aged above 30 has increased significantly; the educational level of 
primary school and lower, junior middle school, high school, college and university are 8.8.%, 26.8%, 40.2%, 
12.2% and 12.1%; the proportion of top six professions – unemployed/laid-off, self employed/freelancers, 
professionals, non managerial white collar, government organization worker and student – are separately 9.8%, 
13.0%, 10.4%, 15.0%, 7.5% and 28.8%; the proportion of different income level from RMB 3001-5000, 
2001-3000, 1501-2000, 1001-1500, below 500 and no income are 9.3%, 15.4%, 13.4%, 13.7%, 14.5%, 18.0% and 
10.0%. 
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Other netizens treat me like a spiritual leader to trust in and rely on. 
And my experiences and words seem to teach some people to be 
optimistic, brave and unswerving; to build trust and love in others. 
In short, more opportunities are offered for all of us to obtain things 
we really need. (Interviewee 12) 
 
4.1.2 Employment of Existing Resources 
When there is creation, there must be employment. Many Tianyaers would think that, 
if active contribution were so tiring and troublesome, why not just listen and read? 
That is what another group of people do. Their employment of resources without 
being charged is the result of decentralization, seen as participants’ selection and 
absorption of resources for themselves. It is the very basic premise for the majority of 
Tianyaers. On the one hand, new resources are assigned values only through the 
process of employment — “no use, no value”. On the other hand, without resource 
employment, resources are hard to circulate, both in virtual environment and real life: 
For ordinary netizens, interaction is a mutual behavior. For instance, 
in Tianya, the poster always creates resources, and other netizens 
provide new resources while receiving these resources through 
comments and tags. It is this interacting process that builds a virtual 
community, doesn’t it? (Interviewee 11) 
 
Presenting resource employment in a continuum according to the degree of 
participation, this section discusses the two extremes — active sharing and passive 
receiving (Fig 4.2). People at different points along this continuum have different 
ability to interact with others and form shared feelings. At the left extreme, resources 
are redistributed effectively and a variety of netizens are interacting with others; at the 
right extreme, a general sense of community is formed but there is no apparent 
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interpersonal interaction. The significance of this continuum is the free choice in the 
level of resource employment along this continuum. 
 
Figure 4.2 A continuum of resource employment 
 
In Tianya, resources tend to flow to those in need or those who are most qualified, 
across geographic boundaries. Traditionally, one person can only be a member of one 
community at one time, behaving according to the rules constituted by his community, 
and asking for help mostly from his neighbors.92 The only way to be a member of 
another community and participate in its activities is to move to that community or 
change his/her residential status. However, this is unrealistic for many people, 
especially the young generation busy at work. 93  As a result, this geographic 
restriction tends to restrict nationwide resource sharing.  
 
However, virtual employment overcomes this shortcoming.94 Rather than merely 
receiving or giving “static” resources, netizens help to distribute them dynamically. 
For example, a Hakka girl told her story in two sub-communities in Tianya, about 
                                                        
92 Traditional communities depend heavily on geographic boundaries such as neighborhoods and villages where 
people live together. But things started to change when interest-based social groups emerged. Without the Internet, 
their influences were still limited.  
93 But the number of immigrants in China, or even worldwide, is steadily increasing because of education, job 
arrangement, marriage and many other factors.  
94 For example, to register as a member of China’s well-known online community – Tianya, people only need to 
click on the “Free Registration” button, type in a new username, enter their chosen password twice, commonly 
used email address, and identifying code, and finally click on the “submission” button. This takes from several 
minutes to several hours to get approval from the administrator. After that, anyone can read posts in this forum, 
share their feelings of anger, hatred, love and happiness on numerous topics such as official corruption, marriage, 
national education system, etc.  
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how she was abandoned by her mother and had to live in poverty with her 
grandmother, how she decided to call her father “uncle” when he wanted to marry 
another woman, and how she studied and worked hard to live a better life, for herself 
and her grandmother. Her optimism, aggressive attitude and firm determination in 
realizing her dreams moved many readers and stimulated their desire to help her, by 
sending her money or supporting her spiritually. Although acephalous, participants’ 
involvement are doubtlessly helping in distributing both material and symbolic 
resources to this Hakka girl, who is badly in need of them. 
 
Another example is the post titled, “Two Primary Schools in the Countryside and one 
Volunteer Teacher”. It is a story about a volunteer teacher’s inspiring deeds — for 
many years, since he was a student, Xu Benyu has given his money, mostly in the 
form of scholarships and subsidies, to help poor children; when he graduated from 
university, he became a volunteer teacher in his hometown, a remote and backward 
village. The poster was certainly the creator of symbolic resources such as the image 
of volunteer teachers, public recognition, which are available to all Chinese netizens 
through CMC. After his creation, many other participants involved as spreaders. In 
December 2004, the result of CCTV Moving China Award’s “Person of the Year” 
was announced, and Xu was one of 10 winners. This award, regarded as a typical 
affirmation of nationwide reputation, is no longer given exclusively to people who 
already have sufficient resources in real life.  
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Being a person who moved netizens in Tianya, and eventually people all over China, 
Xu has earned his reputation from netizens’ voting, commenting, and discussing. 
Even though he may not need it desperately, he can be counted as one of these most 
qualified for it. Furthermore, his reputation may lead to material resources, such as 
money, to support him or his students, or many other poor children all around China. 
Compared to radical creation, the act of mild employment is harder to be measured 
but sometimes more effective. It is true that when something terrible happens, 
non-activists are not the ones to be blamed and punished. Likewise, when something 
meaningful happens, they are not the ones to be praised.  
 
The two orientations of resource flow — to the most needed and qualified — are the 
manifestation of power decentralization and resource redistribution made possible by 
CMC. It is more difficult for traditional authorities to exert control over the flow of 
resources as before. Besides, passive receiving may show no strong yearning for 
self-expression, but a sense of community. When asked about why they choose to 
read posts in Tianya, answers mainly include:  
The content in Tianya is pretty diverse, and the netizens here are 
quite smart and talented. There are always interesting things 
happening.  
Tianya is the most humane virtual community I have ever seen. 
Why should I waste my time looking for another one? 
I came to Tianya because many of my friends in real life told me it 
is an interesting community. Even though I seldom engage in 
discussion here, I don’t want to leave after so many years’ observing. 
I have been used to it. 
I like the atmosphere here – relaxed, random, and creative.  
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For some moderators, helping to redistribute resources among the others is one reason 
for their continued presence in Tianya. For other ordinary Tianyaers, the feeling of 
belonging to this humane community was the only reason. Although having no 
remarkable effects on resource redistribution in Tianya, their online participation may 
spill over into real life, such as sharing with real-life friends information about job 
opportunities people find online. It is especially important for those with few 
resources in the traditional social system. Those with enough resources in real life do 
not need Tianya to make their dreams come true but may simply use it to supplement 
their lives. In this sense, resource usage online also tends to confine the actors within 
the group of the like-minded. 
 
4.2 Network Building 
In practice, absolute freedom for everyone is impossible, even in grassroots virtual 
communities like Tianya. However, once one learns his way around a highly 
developed virtual community system, he can exchange resources with others, 
engendering in other participants an interest in cooperation. With that: 
Shared identities, at community or societal level, tend to be built, 
entailing an ongoing connection between individuals or groups of 
individuals, albeit one that is sometimes tenuous, sensitive and hard 
to sustain. There are multitudinous congenial companions in such a 
large world, and multitudinous netizens will support these right 
things against social inequality. My students, teachers and 
colleagues in police forces have seen my style, and their ratification 
becomes my symbolic resource — support. Besides, the help from 
the media makes my cases hotpoints, which dispels snobbish 
personnel chasing after vicious power and weakens the force trying 
to hit me because of public pressure. Thereafter, my situation is 
improved. (Interviewee 15)  
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The reason for this is that, in this digital era, Chinese society is becoming more 
individualized, causing social indifference, irresponsibility and isolation. To be safe 
and to get support, dispersed individuals enter Tianya to discuss with unfamiliar 
“others”, which makes Tianya a “global electronic agora where the diversity of 
human disaffection explodes in a cacophony of accents”95. In this case, the very factor 
that fosters individualism also helps to glue these isolated individuals together.  
 
It is generally granted that individual value systems, characteristics, preferences, 
skills and knowledge will shape the network formation. When asked to compare their 
online relations with their offline ones, some say that: 
There is not much difference between the two. Many friends in 
Tianya became my good friends in real life. It is the difference 
between Tianya and many other websites: interaction in Tianya is 
based on common interests and ambitions. We have already known 
each other very well in Tianya, and when it penetrates into real life, 
interaction among us won’t change much. (Interviewee 2) 
There is no significant difference between the two, and whether I 
can make friends with someone depends on their personal 
characteristics, morality and interests. (Interviewee 4) 
Of course there is no difference, why should there be? Our 
relationships are based on the same interest in certain social issues 
rather than something shameful. (Interviewee 13) 
 
But there are also others who disagree: 
Social relations online are absolutely weaker than that in real life. 
They have different standards: in Tianya, so-called friends are just 
these with similar interests; while in real life, friends are really 
friends based on individual characteristics and experiences. For 
instance, friends in real life don’t need to talk about politics, but 
merely hang out for lunch or poker games together. (Interviewee 14) 
                                                        
95 Castells, 2001, 138. 
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This section then describes the network rebuilding as a purpose-personality-network 
model, framed as two fundamental assumptions: (1) active participants, aiming at 
obtaining new resources as the purpose of CMC, tends to build heterophilous 
networks; (2) participants who mainly engage in maintaining existing resources 
(through sharing) tend to build homophilous networks. 
 
4.2.1 Heterophilous Relations 
One moderator indicated that there is a virtual group based on the platform of Tianya 
consisting of hundreds of people, each with a distinctive social status, knowledge and 
background, sharing his/her personal experiences and views. Through reading their 
daily conversations and answers to questions such as, “Initially, what mobilized your 
participation in Tianya?” and “What did you do when you found that Tianya was not 
the community you thought before and your requirement had not been realized here?”, 
it became apparent that a considerable number say that online participation was just a 
personal interest. Although existing as an independent group with social boundaries, 
it builds on a shared identity that is considerably inclusive and tolerant of others. Just 
as some members observed: 
Even if no one to share and get support, I’m not alone. Because I 
believe that I’m still myself and there must be someone who can 
understand me in the world. (Member 1) 
Hoping that CMC can help to organize parochial interest groups 
regardless of social values is itself naïve. Without mature value 
system and broad mind, group members will break up with each 
other inevitably, and the group will disappear. (Member 2) 
No one is absolutely right or wrong. The pleasure of CMC is the 
simplicity in sharing, debating, learning and helping. (Member 3) 
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Individuals in this group were well prepared to accept “others” inside or outside of it, 
which provides an opportunity for the formation of heterophilous relations with 
people unlike each other. One important precondition of heterophilous relations is the 
diversity of participants, which reaches out to the marginalized minority on one side, 
and the high-status elites on the other. More significant is the participants’ inclusive 
attitudes. They believe that passive creation of new resources, even in a small amount, 
is a reliable method to exchange for better resources. The two factors, then, strengthen 
the supremacy of creativity in resource usage.  
 
Participants note that if others agree with someone in the course of a conversation, he 
will have a sense of accomplishment; if they challenge him, he will be more 
motivated to prove his own viewpoints. Each tries to make sense through CMC, 
regardless of how sensible (or not) their comments are. But their similar active 
involvement has different results among people with different intentions: 
narrow-minded participants for me-centered purposes will become more intolerant; 
the broad-minded participants for public-centered objectives will be more open.  
If it is proved that opposite ideas are correct, there is no reason for 
me to stick to my own ideas. Why not just accept theirs? 
(Interviewee 1) 
The majority of Tianyaers participate to show that they are smart. 
As I know, most of them, except these peasant-workers, don’t like 
the style of my novel. They prefer to see how peasant-workers are 
abused, then they can express their sympathy. (Interviewee 3) 
You can see from my post that numerous comments make it just a 
mess. I welcome all these trying to make fun and communicate 
normally. The point is many people denigrate traditional culture 
endlessly. They are now still communicating in my posts. Therefore, 
I’m tired of CMC and decide to give this up. (Interviewee 6) 
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The types of participating purposes — me-centered self-expression and 
public-centered social sharing — in some degree determine the feature and strength of 
their respective relations (Figure 4.3). For me-centered purposes, the “charismatic 
leader” organizes his or her statements using expressions with strong preference, at 
the expense of depreciating or repudiating competing voices. Although contrasting 
opinions always exist and are voiced, these radicals’ initial standpoints are hard to 
change, and more likely to be intensified. As a result, people with the same ambition 
in maintaining existing social resources will gather for a common purpose, and form 
strong social relations. A radical Tianyaer told his story: 
I discussed about what Christianity really is and warned these 
Christians and believers not to worship it blindly, in Tianya Zatan, 
which infuriated most of them. They criticized me severely. Their 
great anger ultimately grouped them as a collectivity to resist my 
thoughts, such as refused to read my posts and bribed the 
moderators to block all my posts about Christianity. In real-life 
meeting, they even treated me as the man of Satan. (Interviewee 1) 
 
                
Figure 4.3 Me-centered network (left) and Public-centered network (right) 
 
 
	   79 
When asked why they treated him in such a way, he said he believed that their belief 
in Christianity was so ingrained that others can hardly undermine it. This kind of 
social relations can be read as strong heterophilous relations formed by people with 
distinctive resources. But these networks are exclusive to outsiders, which will 
exacerbate societal cleavages and threaten the survival of civil society. 
 
For public-centered participants, one’s personal interest is not their focus, at least not 
their major concern, just as the virtual group based on Tianya mentioned at the 
beginning of this section. Networks formed here are much more inclusive, and it is 
from the inner core that bonds ramify outwards, but weaker than me-centered ones.  
 
4.2.2 Homophilous Relations 
People tend to interact with individuals similar to them in resources, positions or 
power. Especially for non-activists, creating distinctive thoughts and gaining wide 
support from diverse social sections was not their primary concerns, either because 
they were satisfied with the current situation or were not enthusiastic about changing 
it. And little change will occur to their standpoints without strong challenges. 
Although they may read and think about innovative ideas, they consider paying much 
attention to them a time consuming and troublesome exercise. As they said: 
I have already built my own value system, and it is too strong to be 
affected by my online participation. (Interviewee 2) 
I focus on expressing my ideas online, rather than interacting with 
others. (Interviewee 3) 
Surely, most netizens participate in conversations they are interested 
in. (Interviewee 11) 
	   80 
Engaging in Tianya is just part of my life. I don’t have so much time 
to argue with most of the voices there. (Interviewee 12) 
 
For them, Tianya is more a sphere for enjoying life and relaxing or, in other words, 
self-expression. Even more, obtaining better resources has little attraction, since they 
are either unable to do it, or they believe that CMC is not so important and powerful: 
We peasants do not rely on Internet resources to solve our problems. 
First of all, I don’t think the Internet is so capable. Second, I have 
too many things to care about for earning a better life. If there are 
other alternatives, I don’t want to use forces. Third, we ordinary 
peasants know little about the law, so when something happens, we 
always deal with it through minjian (unofficial) approaches. 
(Interviewee 8) 
 
In general, forming homophilous networks here is investigated in two approaches: (1) 
distinguishing oneself from certain groups of identity, values and culture; or (2) 
attributing oneself into certain groups. The first approach is always carried out in 
negotiating or competing with a common “enemy”, such as the government or an 
abhorred/detested public figure. This kind of public-centered homophilous networks 
gives individuals strong power in changing the courses of high-profile social agendas 
and realizing social goals. The second approach is more likely to take place under the 
condition that participants are eager to find a circle within which to “reside” and 
obtain a sense of belonging. The me-centered networks in this case are more random 
but might be intensified eventually. Even more, both approaches offer opportunities 
for sharing of resources, which might help to form heterophilous relations. 
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The first example is the wide use of “fifty-cent party” (wu mao dang)96. Originated in 
a university BBS forum, “fifty-cent party” is now used to define someone who says 
something positive or neutral about the government, an entity that is actually 
disdained and hated by the public. Anyone using this expression is identifying those 
holding pro-government views as a group, while at the same time positioning 
him/herself within another. Although that may appear irrational, it somehow shows 
people’s efforts in searching for an identity, one that is independent of official 
opinions and traditional expert support. Along with it, group members feel a sense of 
connection within respective groups that tends to form homophilous connections.  
 
Insufficient resources for the disadvantaged in the past have aggravated their reliance 
on the government and tolerance of its misbehavior, which are counterproductive to 
the awareness of autonomy. The initiation of political practice such as community 
deliberation is, to some degree, a result of elites’ political commitment, which rarely 
considers public requirements. This, in return, reinforces the hierarchy between social 
sections.  
 
But CMC is making a difference. As Dun’an (the director of the Internet Propaganda 
Management Office in Anhui Province) pointed out: “On the Internet, an ordinary 
person can make ‘one call to draw millions of responses’ ”97. Actually not all these 
                                                        
96 “Fifty-cent party” represents commentators employed by the government to engage in online discussion like 
ordinary netizens but praising the government, and will be paid by the number of messages posted — fifty cents 
for each message. 
97 “News on Internet-based social movement have reached millions of clicks, making government cadres feel 
worried”, accessed August 25, 2010, http://news.qq.com/a/20090601/000561.htm 
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responses are from regular netizens, but some are just from “waverers”. The 
possibility of these waverers’ active involvement comes from their desires to be 
networked. For instance, as one said, “staying with people in the same camp makes 
me feel like I’m not working alone.” But whether one event can provoke some 
waverers to show up (or not) depends on the nature of the event and its relevance to 
netizens and their abilities, experiences and personal perceptions. These deeply 
embedded social connections might not immediately constitute a shared identity, (one 
that provokes and sustains collective actions), but it does indicate an initial gathering. 
The model of the combination of different relations, then, is summarized in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 A purpose-personality-network model of relations through CMC 
        Purposes of Investment 
 














4.2.3 Dispersive Networks, Stable Relations 
The difference between homophilous and heterophilous networks could lie in their 
choice of methods to achieve something or the degree of their planned depth of 
transformation, rather than something basic in nature, as presented in Table 4.3. The 
relationship between them is interpreted as a cooperation-competition pattern. 
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Table 4.3 Comparison of four types of networks 
Category Strengths Weakness 
Strong hetero-networks Easy to redistribute resources, 
and lubricate cooperation 
Might be inappropriately 
used by some individuals 
Weak hetero-networks Easy to join and leave Weak identity sharing, no 
clear agenda or objectives 
Strong homo-networks Almost completely exclusive Hard to enter and leave 
Weak homo-networks Adaptive and resistant to 
attack 
Cost more to be mobilized 
 
Indeed, both homophious and heterophilous relations have their own merits, and 
social actors do not need to abandon one type for another. In addition, the above 
method of differentiation is somehow farfetched. In fact, creation and employment 
are concurrent most of the time, thereafter, homo- and heterophilous networks are 
interweaved with each other. People are not necessarily required to withdraw from 
one type of usage in order to adopt another, and in fact, no one will be completely 
involved in a single type of relations. Besides, unrestricted identity switches/changes, 
transcending relational limits, lubricate the networking process.  
 
Although there is a discrepancy between people in different digital-hierarchies, CMC 
is accelerating resource exchanges among them. The major reason is that CMC, being 
based on personal knowledge, experiences and ways of expression, restrains the 
disturbance of ostensible determinants such as age, appearance and gender. Although 
weak networks are vulnerable to external challenges, the interrelated essence of 
crosscutting identities is often successful at bridging unacquainted persons together 
and enabling their cooperation in the long run. Although strong networks are 
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exclusive to the outsiders, it is easier to get people into them for a common purpose. 
Thus the generalization here is: strong networks are good for the stability of specific 
groups, while weak networks are good for the stability of communities at large 
without central leadership and institutional protection. From these analyses, it is clear 
that the absence of collective identity, group leadership, and a social environment 
reflect or even determine the mechanisms of mobilizing collective actions. 
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Chapter 5 
Collective Mobilization:  
Duo Maomao-Case 
 
5.1 Collective Mobilization 
Numerous social issues are posted in Tianya Zatan everyday, but only a small 
percentage provoke public concern, and even fewer result in offline mass movement. 
Yang (2009) attributed this to the “lack of public resonance”: 
A college student who posts messages to protest the lack of air 
conditioning in her classroom may gain some classmates’ support, 
but the issues has little chance of going beyond the campus. 
Generally speaking, issues that are more relevant to the everyday 
experiences of the larger population, that appeal to the moral sense 
of right or wrong, and that have a more concrete attribution of blame 
have higher degrees of resonance.98 
 
Seen in this context, whether a social issue is likely to mobilize collective action 
would depend on the type of event per se. Then the questions become: what kinds of 
events are likely to attract public attention and drive collective action? Why this 
particular event, rather than that? Table 5.1 summarizes the content analyses of the 
top eight high-profile social events listed in People.com. From this, it can be 
concluded that these events go beyond simple complaining or bristling when they: (1) 
feature real-life problems that challenge the value system shared by a large population; 
                                                        
98 Yang Guobin. The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen Activism Online, 2009, 57. Public resonance here is 
not just the consent among a group of people, but the shared perception at community or societal level, which can 
provoke nation-wide emotions. 
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(2) are rooted within the local context, or a minimum level of concreteness, in terms 
of both the “place” and practical pertinence.  
 
Table 5.1 Representativeness and concreteness of top-eight events in 200999 
Events Representativeness Concreteness 
Wang Shuai Land acquisition Directed at Lingbao government. 
Deng Yujiao The disadvantaged 
against the officials 
A government official died, and a 
young, low-status woman was arrested. 
Panyu Dump Environment 
protection 
Burning trash in a settled residential 
area.  
Duo Maomao Abnormal death in 
prison 




Economic interest and 
law implementation 
A man was arrested, and he cut his 
fingers to prove his innocence. 
The most arrogant 
wife of a colonel  
Misuse of public 
power 
The wife of a high-status colonel 
vilified a commentator in a place of 
interest. 
Xu Baobao Doctors’ dereliction of 
duty  
A baby died because of the doctor’s 





Hundreds of residents in that area 
gathered to oppose the demolition. 
 
As can be seen in Table 5.1, all of the events contradict the social norms and values 
shared by a large segment of the population. Although more participants do not 
necessarily guarantee success, many Chinese believe that “strength lies in numbers” 
and they have a shared history of mass movements that overthrew the government 
and changed political regimes. The nature of Chinese political regime at this stage is 
still authoritarian, reflected in the endogenous selection of state leaders and 
high-ranking government officials, the regulation of mass media, and the limited 
                                                        
99 Available online at http://yq.people.com.cn/zt/zy5/. Accessed January 8, 2011. That year, People.com became 
the first official news website to initiate a “Public Opinion Channel”, and is generally recognized as the state’s 
attention to online public opinion. The following year, it began to rank these in terms of popularity, severity and 
representativeness. 
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freedom of speech. Over time, distrust in the government has become ingrained in 
people’s minds. When events take place, netizens deliver radical speeches in Tianya 
to gather public anger or sympathy. When the collective intelligence reaches its apex, 
real-life mass movements are likely to break out.  
 
Many of these Internet-based movements appear “rooted in local context” but in fact 
seem to seek national or even global impact, making these social networks more open. 
Issues in all social areas could turn into collective action, but the focus here is on 
events that shape local contexts, with real subjects and toward specific government or 
social policies. To mobilize collective action for events with the above features, 
general mechanisms must emerge out of the complexity. This section suggests 
trajectories of action by identifying three crucial determinants: collective identity, 
group leadership, and the social environment. 
 
5.1.1 Collective Identity 
In contemporary China, and as many studies have shown100, collective actions are 
rooted in crises of community and identity in real life. The moderator of “Academic 
China” in Tianya observed: 
                                                        
100	   “Every cooperative group of people exists in the face of a competitive world because that group of people 
recognizes there is something valuable that they can gain only by banding together, looking for a group’s 
collective goods is a way of looking for the elements that bind isolated individuals into a community.” Howard 
Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company 1993, 13. “It is induced by the crisis of patriarchalism, and the subsequent disintegration of 
the traditional nuclear family, as constituted in the late nineteenth century. It is sustained (but not produced) by the 
new patterns of urbanization, as suburban and exurban sprawl, and the de-linking between function and meaning 
in the micro-places of megacities, individualize and fragment the spatial context of livehood.” Castells, The 
Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society. New York: Oxford University Press 2001, 129.  
“Furthermore, the crisis of identity and community and the expansion and deepening of social grievances compel 
citizens to expand their channels of expression and to innovate contentious forms.” Yang Guobin, 2009,101.	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During this transitional period (economic marketization, political 
democratization and cultural diversification), Chinese citizens are 
suffering from high unemployment, social instability and 
government unreliability. As a result, traditional value system and 
cultural ascription have been destroyed or at least undermined. 
Chinese people have no religion or belief but merely pursuit for 
material interests. (Interviewee 5) 
 
In the long run, it is likely that an increase in social instability will result in more 
Chinese netizens’ taking radical actions in multiple social areas, when no other 
approach is available. Collective mobilization will increasingly emphasize common 
values or perceived membership in a like-minded community. This section provides a 
comprehensive explanation on how collective identity can be formed within a large 
population. 
 
In general, this pattern locates the origin of collective action in the cognitive process 
of identity formation, through which civilization contradicts and ultimately reverses 
the traditional structure.101 It highlights that shared values are indispensable in 
bringing together unfamiliar people in making claims and acting on those claims. The 
value of democracy and freedom make people more aware of the perceived social 
illness in China, and changes individual and collective psychology; grievance at hand 
always manipulates the efficacy of organizing networked individuals, trying to make 
a difference in accomplishing tasks.  
 
                                                        
101  It is in line with Yang’s identification of three issues prominent in Internet contention. “First is 
neonationalism… Second is the rights of vulnerable individuals and disempowered social groups… Third is social 
injustices committed by the powerful and the rich, reflecting new types of social conflicts.” Yang Guobin, 2008, 
129. 
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5.1.1.1 Conflicts in Chinese Society  
In Tianya, building on the strength of the youth reasonably means building on the 
values of this generation, which largely center on economic interest, social security 
and political equality. 102  Among the eight events in Table 5.1, two cases – 
Entrapment in Shanghai, and Kunming Luoshiwan – are associated with economic 
hardship or the national pursuit of economic interests; one case – Panyu Dump – is 
related to economic development; one case – Xu Baobao – is about social security; 
four cases – Wang Shuai, Deng Yujiao, Duo Maomao and The most arrogant wife of 
a colonel – target political power.  
 
Each of these events exhibits an aspect of conflicts, while the actions for these events 
are in themselves a manifested challenge to democracy, freedom, social justice and so 
on, arising from social interaction with others, giving vent to ostracism, hatred, 
sympathy, friendship and love. In the two economic cases, it was the longstanding 
issue of the officials’ inappropriate or illicit self-gains of economic interests through 
violating ordinary people’s legal rights. In the case of environment protection, it was 
the lingering problem of local governments’ asymmetric decision-making at the 
expense of public interest. In the social case, it was the bureaucrats’ shielding and 
covering up for each other and the severe problems in the medical care system. In the 
two political cases, it was the misuse of political power, official-civilian conflicts, and 
                                                        
102 According to the China Internet Network Information Center’s Statistical Report of Internet Development (July 
2009), 61.5% of Internet users in 2009 are below 30. The prominent feature of these Chinese is their burning 
desire for economic interests. But a large proportion just focus on their jobs in real life and try their best to earn 
more money, while others are enraged by the difficulty to achieve success and the inequality in Chinese society, 
and choose to vent their anger online. So compared to non-participants in Tianya, participants express higher 
degree of attention to the social condition in China. 
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the low degree of participation. All of these events have increasingly intensified 
conflicts, scared and infuriated the masses. 
 
5.1.1.2 Conflicts Generate Grievance 
The clash between social sections in multiple social areas tend to produce grievance 
when social actors reaffirm their repugnance at a common “enemy”103. But conflict in 
itself is not enough. It should be accompanied by participants’ deep belief in the 
existence and severity of that conflict to boost enduring grievance. The shared 
“enemy” from concrete examples threatening the values of a large population then 
breaks the vulnerable cohesion. In detail, the categorization of posts collected from 
Tianya Zatan in terms of the difference of their respective conflict and responding 
grievance is presented in Table 5.2.  
 
The significance of grievance lies in its ability to reduce the costs of mobilization, 
especially when it cooperates with norms of reciprocity, such that good behavior is 
rewarded and bad behavior is punished, whether immediately or far away in the future. 
In contemporary China, public awareness of social responsibility and legal rights is 
still weak. Regardless of whether the question is, “What makes you decide to take 
part in Tianya?” or “What is the purpose of your participation in Tianya?”, no answer 
is or has similar meaning to “it’s my own right” or “it’s my responsibility”. Tianyaers 
are more concerned that “if I do not voice or fight for these victims, who knows 
                                                        
103 Such as the imperial examination system, a national brand, a search engine, the police, an online shop and so 
on. 
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whether it will happen to me or not next time”.  
 
Table 5.2 Types of grievance responding to conflicts 
Conflicts between Types of grievance No. of posts 
No conflict No grievance 388 
Traditional and modern education 
Educational shortcomings 
5 
Knowledge and morality 5 
Education and economic interests 3 
Western and Chinese education 4 
Officials and citizens / state and 
society / the poor and rich / different 
jobs / law and power 
Public power abuse 72 
Social insecurity  63 
Economic monopoly 26 
Social inequality 20 
Irrational policies 29 
Radicals and rationalists Social ignorance 23 
Doctors and patients 
Hospital malfeasance 17 
Corruption  5 
Consumers and corporations Business untrustworthiness  13 
Economic interest and cultural value 
Cultural backslide 5 
Cultural monopoly 9 
Different schools Cultural ignorance 9 
Different countries Foreign policy 3 
 
This public grievance may become exaggerated by business entities when economic 
interest is involved. Tianya itself longs for both economic profit and social reputation. 
When a worker searches in Tianya for information on how to protect his legal rights 
in obtaining money from the contractor, communities copy this event and put it on the 
top so as to garner more clicks. Consequently, the active involvement of numerous 
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social actors attracts more participants and that, in turn, escalates the event. People 
with similar experiences are likely to form a shared identity over time, and that public 
“grievance” becomes socially constructed into social causes. Collective action takes 
place at some point when the controversy flares into a full-fledged social cause.  
 
5.1.1.3 From Grievance to a Sense of “We” 
In rational choice institutionalism, there are three ways to create a sense of a shared 
“we” – authority, persuasion and transaction – and these are also tenable in Tianya, 
but in new forms. The impact of these methods varied from community to community, 
from one case to another, online to offline, and also during the course of any event.  
 
Being more leftist by nature, Tianyaers seldom resort to authority for mobilization. 
Often, authority is challenged or resisted, since people in China regard the existing 
authority as having more power than legitimacy, as its power was bestowed or 
inherited. Among opponents, the common grievance toward central authority 
becomes aggregated into a sense of “we”. Netizens acknowledge that any perceived 
authority in Tianya comes from the online activists who contribute “group leadership” 
to collective mobilization, as explained in the next section. 
 
In contemporary China, the disadvantaged shape the frames through which they 
perceive their grievances and collective action. On the one hand, the primary 
reference and purpose for their involvement is to resolve their fellowman’s social 
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problems and injustice. Living in a virtual society where deception permeates, the 
experiences of fellow netizens seem more trusted than pure propaganda perpetrated 
by the authority. Tianya seems to put this psychology to advantage in motivating 
waverers and lurkers. One example is seeking fame. Low cost and high publicity 
make Tianya the perfect place to introduce, “pack” and “sell” actors, particularly 
people without formal channels, insofar as the tactics are creative enough. Within its 
online community, the few rare successes are highly tooted to stir others to action, 
due to the perceived homophily of ordinary netizens’ resources, positions and 
cyber-power. On the other hand, it is not out of participants’ virtuous objectives to 
benefit the disadvantaged, but rather, toward their own hierarchical power. This is one 
important reason for collective action – an exchange for better resources, especially 
for members whose social networks lack high-status officials. It also highlights group 
leadership in multiple opportunities for resistance. 
 
5.1.2 Group Leadership 
The purpose for better resources or political positions as mentioned above implicates 
that media agents or online participants themselves may assume a key role in the 
courses of social events. The primary factor in this assumption is online activists – the 
group with more or better resources. In general, online activists have their fingers on 
the pulse of the community, mediating between the state and society. How they serve 
the common purposes through CMC is discussed below, mainly in two aspects: (1) 
they are grassroots participants able to freely interact with fellow netizens and easily 
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aggregate support from them; (2) they are also the elites at the upper end of 
“cyber-hierarchy”, capable of mobilizing ordinary people toward a unitary collective 
action competing with state power mainly by “applying subtle forms of pressure on 
followers”104. This section then focuses on how these activists, as a cohort of opinion 
leaders, frame possible solutions to diverse social problems. 
 
5.1.2.1 As Grassroots Participants 
Many of these famous web activists are the nondescript colleagues that surround us; 
or, as one noted: “Although I’m more active than many other Tianyaers, I’m just an 
ordinary netizen in this community”. Some bring their own unpleasant experiences to 
the public for support, advice, or emotional consolation, some respond to mass ideas, 
requirements and questions, and some write commentary or op-ed pieces. There are 
no telltale signs that distinguish them from ordinary netizens. Everyone is free to 
“talk” to and exchange attitudes with them similar to chatting with old friends face to 
face, perhaps even more frankly, their real life identities cloaked by cyberspace. In 
terms of resource creation and employment, there are fewer barriers between online 
activists and non-activists than that in real life. In Tianya, the boundary between 
activists and non-activists is blurred and constantly changing: 
Everyday, I will receive emails asking for help via Tianya Message. 
Clearly, for these people, few other effective channels are available. 
So they contact me online. It can be seen that we are all equal online. 
(Interviewee 10) 
 
                                                        
104 O’Brien, Kevin J., and Rachel E. Stern, “Introduction: Studying Contention in Contemporary China”, in 
Popular Protest in China, edited by Kevin J. O’Brien (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 17. 
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These perceived homophilous relations make it easy to switch identities in Tianya: 
activists can act as ordinary netizens when they choose to, and lurkers can behave as 
activists when they are eager to share their thoughts; one can be an activist in one 
group, event, or occasion, but a non-activist in another. Experiencing the feelings, 
demands and preferences on both sides can generate multiple considerations, 
compassion and understanding among participants which, in the long term, could help 
form a shared identity, such as feeling sorry about the quality of milk powder for 
babies, hatred toward a corrupt government official, sympathy for a prisoner. 
 
This feeling of “being equal”, along with the activists’ profound knowledge and 
experiences also created interest and engagement. One Tianyaer described as such: 
After I read the works of these knowledgeable persons, like 
Dangnian Mingyue and Wu Xianyun, I decided to register as a 
member of Tianya. Because I found that there were so many 
intelligent people actively involving in communication in some 
sub-communities. In order to talk to them and share my views with 
them, I registered. I’m afraid I would not do that if they were not 
there. After registration, especially after talking with them, they 
were not my focus any more. I went everywhere in this community 
to find things I was interested in and eager to share my opinions. But 
I will notice and pay attention to them immediately whenever 
something special happens to them or they launch activities I find 
meaningful and interesting, simply because I believe that there is a 
kind of connection between us, and we share some values. 
(Interviewee 6) 
 
But an activist’s withdrawal could also cause their followers to quit: 
In cyberspace, any ID is a node, and the network is weaved by 
thousands of ‘nets’. Sometimes, when the node of him moves, many 
other nodes close to it are likely to be influenced. For instance, A, as 
one of my friends online, will certainly leave this space at the first 
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time when I stop participating in it. In fact, he is just an online friend 
that everyone may have. (Interviewee 17) 
 
In this sense, “growing up” in grassroots communities, activists that are popular and 
have many followers, often find themselves wielding the baton of public opinion and 
becoming the center of social networks. Over time, they are perceived as elites. 
 
But there are also exceptions due to community design and personal attitudes. On the 
one hand, well-functioned Tianya can preserve its stability by attracting netizens’ 
sustainable participation via all kinds of strategies. Those who believe that they have 
benefited from the participation will continue to be involved even if important elites 
leave Tianya. On the other hand, some people participate with strong personal 
standings, and they believe that: 
Although I’ll feel a bit upset when some of these elites I’ve been 
familiar with leave Tianya, I’ll not just leave because of them. New 
elites will come and new hot topics will emerge thanks to their effort, 
to attract my attention. (Interviewee 10) 
 
5.1.2.2 As Elites 
Compared with the real world, there are fewer barriers for non-activists to approach 
activists in Tianya; nevertheless, activists hold a higher cyber-status. Most of the time, 
activists indulge in creating resources, particularly knowledge in citizenship, social 
responsibility, social morality, government performance and so on, while 
non-activists employ these resources for personal purposes or make them available to 
friends. As the hubs of civic knowledge, online activists weaken the public’s heavy 
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reliance on official intellectuals and lop-sided hierarchical social ties. In the past, 
many elites in China enjoyed a close relationship with the government, making it 
difficult to form sincere and reliable social relations; the circle was impenetrable to 
those without power. Online activists are in a position above ordinary netizens, but 
that is a position acquired based on their predominant knowledge and skills.105 In 
short, they gain their social status from public agreement. This is the prominent 
difference between traditional and digital “hierarchy”. The existence of moderate 
digital “hierarchy” motivates some netizens’ creation, for the purpose of obtaining 
higher position. In so doing, heterophilous networks mobilize collective actions on 
account of activists’ charisma and non-activists’ desire for better resources. 
 
Often, participants find that an effective way to resolve their problems is to ask 
community moderators and online activists for help: 
If someone messages me about his/her problems that are really 
important and meaningful to the community as well as ordinary 
members, I will do some kind of recommendation or put them on 
the top. It depends. (Interviewee 4) 
My opponents always bribe the moderators to delete my posts or 
block my ID in some columns. (Interviewee 5) 
There are a bunch of factors that affect the possibility of making 
some online posts popular and problems resolved, one of which is 
your connection with the community management. Your close 
relation with some moderators or activists will help you to attract 
others, and to a large extent, determines the success of your case. 
(Interviewee 9) 
Many netizens ask us moderators to delete some negative posts or 
put some important posts on the top by promising some kinds of 
                                                        
105 “This can also be seen…because it allows the vast amounts of information generated in cyberspace to be 
ordered according to the quality of someone’s words and not their social or institutional position, their loud voice, 
gender, race or whatever. Those who gain recognition online and whose messages are automatically accorded 
some respect, reflecting a higher position in online hierarchies, may achieve this status through the quality of their 
writing.” Tim Jordan, Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and the Internet. (London and New 
York: Routledge 1999), 81. 
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recompense like money. (Interviewee11) 
 
It is about the power of networks among heterophilous groups. Once, I contacted a 
famous Tianya web commentator106 about a participant’s sad story about being 
disregarded by the social security system. Just as I had anticipated, he refused: 
I have read this story, but I’m afraid I can’t help him. His problem is 
an ordinary example of what most Chinese are now suffering from, 
rather than a very specific event. So it is difficult to mobilize other 
netizens for collective actions to help him. Maybe I can do 
something, but I don’t think that could really resolve his problem.  
 
Not surprisingly, there are also individuals and groups who prefer to work quietly in 
the background to promote specific events and social causes. But as one netizen says, 
“as long as they do it in accordance with the public opinion rather than misguide it, it 
is ok…” In addition, the freedom of moderators’ choosing what to highlight and what 
to suppress is still limited, but much higher than that in real communities. 
 
How does cyber-leadership help mobilize collective action in a seemingly 
authoritarian regime? Simply put, for activists themselves, social networks provide 
the opportunity to exert pressure on non-activists for cooperation – “I will go only if 
you go”. The fear of being marginalized and abandoned makes ordinary members 
choose to follow the activists whenever possible. The oratorical skills of the leaders, 
the participatory design of the community and the characteristics of participants are 
crucial in promoting participants’ belief in collective grievance and actions. In this 
                                                        
106 He has written dozens of posts commenting some social events, and most of his contributions turn out to be 
effective in drawing public attention and changing the courses of these events toward a relatively good end. 
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regard, group leadership determines which strategies could promote their mobilization, 
when and how to carry them out, when to stop, and what results they should strive 
toward.107  
 
Even more, flexible networks provide participants with a sense of security. Collective 
action could be mobilized against authoritarian control, the incompetence of Chinese 
Communist Party, the corruption of government officials, and the plight of low-status 
people, using vitriolic words. In the past, they would have been arrested for 
“subverting the state”. Now, even though there are reported instances of many 
influential online activists being “invited by the Chinese government to have a cup of 
tea”108, fewer have been arrested. One reason could be that they are too popular 
among their “fans”, many of whom are also activists holding positions in diverse 
social sections.  
I have made many friends through participation. And these brilliant 
and righteous friends, including, of course these working for 
traditional and new media, their help provides me wealth. Because 
of this wealth, I win and I am safe. Thanks to them. (Interviewee 15 
– an activist) 
 
The existence of these kinds of symbolic resources makes the networks between 
participants difficult to be broken, like a spider’s web. It can be expected that if the 
government arrests certain activists, the effects of CMC could easily penetrate into 
                                                        
107  The frequent use of metaphors and homonyms representing sensitive words, initiated by activists, such as 
Duo Maomao (hide-and-seek), He Xie (harmony), Fu Wo Cheng (push-up), Qi Shi Ma (seventy yards) and so on, 
are making CMC more frank, incisive, provocative and unsparing, under moderate security. 
108 “Having a cup of tea” is a specific expression in Chinese context meaning that the authorities are angry at what 
someone said or did, force him to go somewhere the government regulated, admit his mistake and promise that he 
won’t do it again. 
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offline life and China society would then be in chaos, the severity of which will be 
unimaginable. The government dare not take the risk. Thus, by initiating topics, 
leading discussions, and bonding dispersed individuals, web activists create a hybrid 
civic environment for collective identity sharing, a new identity neutralizing online 
idealism and offline realism. Especially when emergencies arise, group leadership 
increases the likelihood of connecting isolated individuals together, within the 
specific social environment.  
 
5.1.3 Social Environment 
Whether considering structural constraints or cultural-political opportunity context, 
the process of collective mobilization occurs in the broader social environment. 
Compared with democratic countries, the relative weakness of China’s civil society 
and the social networks of NGOs is often attributed to the dual influence of state 
manipulation and society concession. In authoritarian China, which is heavily 
dominated by patron-client relationships, the power to exclude ordinary citizens from 
decision-making is a crucial measurement of government performance and an 
indispensible tactic to keeping its political authority. Hence, wherever necessary, 
anti-hierarchical effects through CMC are stopped, and veracious mass media 
muzzled. Before the implosion of this information era, it was universally deemed by 
the public in China that no matter what they did and how much they contributed to the 
national economy, they were incapable of influencing government policies. What the 
government said was synonymous with the ancient imperial edicts.  
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After the long-term ill-performance of the Chinese government in providing civil 
services and protecting personal rights, today’s citizens are less willing to abide by 
government policies perceived to be unfair. They radically criticize officials’ 
corruption in BBS forums, write articles or reports analyzing the ingrained problems 
in Chinese institutions and blog about their worries for China’s future. Regardless 
how much time they spend online, what types of applications they use, and with 
whom they cooperate, these Chinese netizens show a deep yearning for social 
transformation. But although citizens’ CMC has, to some extent, changed this 
situation, the government’s power will not disappear overnight. 
 
Instead, government is still active in every corner of China’s virtual society, in the 
form of consulting with ordinary netizens, watching their behaviors, and controlling 
their speeches. Nowadays, they find engagement an effective way to control 
anti-government behaviors. Both government officials and Tianya moderators say that 
the government designates “professionals” to monitor the activists it defines as such, 
and to search for potential activists all day along. Once someone has an intention to 
do things the government perceives as detrimental to its power, it will take action 
quickly. More strategically, the government takes the initiative in encouraging CMC 
to control its possible harm within a certain scope or even to use it for its own gains.  
 
On the one hand, CMC is a good way to keep people online and off the streets. Every 
human being needs a channel to vent his negative and positive emotions within a 
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certain period of time. Tianya has proved itself to be one choice. After venting, the 
individual often calms down, which reduces the possibility of taking action that could 
be the consequence when their emotions cannot be released. As one government 
official noted: “If it is not here, it should be somewhere else. Then why not let them 
complain, argue, and accuse here on the Internet where we can see?” Seen in this 
context, CMC provides the basis for the state’s control over society. In most cases, 
collective actions take place only with the government’s permission, connivance, or 
even promotion. Only collective actions which the government permits as not 
disruptive to its control, will be welcomed; or, as O’Brien and Stern generalized, the 
“less sensitive themes, including anti-Japanese nationalism, the rights of the 
vulnerable, and local corruption, enjoy a degree of tolerance or, at least, 
indifference”109. 
 
On the other hand, the government’s tolerance of CMC is a way to gain political 
legitimacy for itself while disrupting the process of empowering powerless groups. 
Partial relinquishment of one set of institutions in favor of another is inevitable in any 
country, which breeds “institutional vacuum” in the interim. This vacuum, that China 
is now undergoing, has undermined government’s legitimacy and increased social 
instability. By adjusting and refining its policies and trying to win back the public 
consent, the government is now finding solutions to increase its legitimacy. In the 
Duo Maomao-Case discussed in the next chapter, the establishment of the “Truth 
                                                        
109 Kevin J. O’Brien and Rachel E. Stern. “Introduction: Studying Contention in Contemporary China”. In 
Popular Protest in China, ed., Kevin J. O’Brien, 11-25. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2008), 14. 
	   103 
Investigation Committee” exemplifies the government’s efforts to direct online 
activities into institutionalized channels. Through these endeavors, mobilization for 
collective actions has much to do with state-society relations.  
 
Although few would admit it, in a culture deeply embedded in Confucianism, many 
Chinese citizens still accept government permission or institutional regulations as the 
only resource of legitimacy for collective actions110. When the government initiates 
certain collective action, participants feel safe and meaningful to participate, 
especially for these non-activists with few resources to rely on. However, netizens are 
not invited as co-decision-maker, but as the resources for officials’ decision-making. 
Hence, the practice could easily develop in the direction contrary to the government’s 
expectations. Online venting could escalate to more serious and uncontrollable 
collective actions when participants do not feel satisfied by what they have done and 
how the other side – individuals or organizations they are questioning – have reacted. 
It happened in the DMM-Case. CMC in Tianya, from this section, is far beyond 
supplementing face-to-face communication, or transcending group boundary for 
resource sharing. 
 
5.2  Duo Maomao-Case 
The question this realm of investigation poses is: how is collective action effected in 
virtual communities? This section presents a case study into the alternative answers. 
                                                        
110 It is also the case according to “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Assemblies, Processions and 
Demonstrations”. Only these approved by governing organs are legal. Otherwise, organizers or people in charge of 
actions will be arrested.  
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Different from the formal models of collective action, this case shows a more 
dispersive, more spontaneous but still influential type. More specifically, it seeks the 
influences of CMC on the development, legitimacy, effectiveness, and participants’ 
mobilization of collective action. 
 
5.2.1 The Occurrence  
On February 8, 2009, a suspect named Li Qiaoming was injured and became 
unconscious while under prison custody in Jinning, Yunnan Province, and died on 
February 12. After formal investigation and verification, the public security and 
procuratorial departments in Jinning publicized it as an accident. Their version of the 
story: Li and several other prisoners were playing a game of “hide-and-seek” while in 
custody, during which they had a dispute and Pu (another prisoner) kicked Li in the 
chest and punched him on the left side of his head, which led to Li hitting his head on 
a solid door frame. After being informed of this investigation result, Li’s family 
thought it was too rash and irresponsible, and even ridiculous since Li had been in 
good health all along. Information about this was posted online immediately, and 
35,000 posts emerged online within hours of the event. Questioning and 
dissatisfaction spread and quickly escalated into an overwhelming tide of public 
anger.  
 
Soon, sarcastic commentary or posts titled “Have you played ‘Duo Maomao’ today?”, 
“Cherish your life, keep away from ‘Duo Maomao’”, “Who is going to be the next die 
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of ‘Duo Maomao?’” appeared online or were published on traditional media. 
Computer games named “Real Version of ‘Duo Maomao’” became popular. Cartoons 
describing governmental departments as ridiculous, and the malfeasance of violence 
within, came out one after another. At this stage, it was just an ordinary case. This 
death due to prison brutality was neither the first nor the last example in China. But it 
was escalated by diverse subjective and objective factors, the process of which was 
generalized into three stages: grievance accumulation against the government, the 
bifurcation of public opinion, and rational introspection from group leadership. The 
mechanisms are tested and shown in the chart below, generated from content analyses 
of posts that are highly related to Duo Maomao-Case (Figure 5.1). 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Daily posts on the Duo Maomao Case remained, Tianya, February 13 – March 2, 2009111 
 
                                                        
111 There were 750 posts with the words “Duo Maomao” in the titles, archived in Tianya, till January 28, 2011. 
From February 13 to March 2, 2009, there were 131 posts highly related to the event. This thesis limited the study 
to the 131 posts within the 18-day period, as most of the posts were generated during this period. There were posts 
far beyond this time frame and highly related to the case, but they do not affect the general tendency of this figure. 
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5.2.2 Collective Mobilization Through CMC in the DMM-Case 
5.2.2.1 Grievance Accumulation 
The DMM-Case gave unfamiliar netizens a reason to “meet up” with similar anger at 
government ill-performance. Fundamentally, the public animosity towards the 
government is a historical problem highly related to the long-term misuse of public 
power.112 But more directly, the local government made a mistake at the beginning, 
by covering up the accident under the guise of game playing. Few people believed the 
story, even though high status government officials had participated in the hearing of 
the case and took the initiative in opening up the process of the trial. To the public, 
anything publicized by the local government was problematic; or, as a Tianyaer said, 
“In whatever Cases, as long as government officials participate, it is their fault”.  
 
Sina.com framed their survey question by asking, “What do you think of the DMM 
Event?” The findings, presented below, show that the public’s distrust in institutions 
is extremely high. Perhaps the public would have accepted this event as an ordinary 
accident had the government admitted that this had been caused by their negligence. 
However, the cover-up of the truth only led to more complaints and resistance. 
 
                                                        
112 As a professor from HUST (Huazhong University of Science and Technology) said, “The more profound 
reason is that some state organs attempts to equip themselves with wills independent from state will…At that time, 
these organs did not merely against the public but also national interest. They were not public agencies any more, 
rather, private organizations holding powerful public power.” Accessed January 24, 2011, at 
http://news.sina.com.cn/pl/2009-03-02/071417315729. shtml.. 
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Figure 5.2 What do you think of the DMM event?113 
 
To express their emotions, people carried out conversations, in the form of discourses 
based on texts, images, and videos. The charm of discourses was not from the degree 
of anger and resentment expressed by most netizens: “the higher the more attractive”, 
instead, it was from the tactic of using an uncolored tune to express violent feelings. 
In Tianya, every social issue can easily be transformed into a political issue through 
discourse. But direct conversation on these issues about their political implication was 
considered taboo. By adding a lighthearted tone to these issues, opinions were easily 
accepted by the masses, and considered effective and riskless. Many preferred and 
                                                        
113 This figure was drawn according to the numbers of persons chose different options toward the question “What 
do you think of the DMM Event”, and it received 59153 answers in total. Option 1 was “Died from playing ‘Duo 
Maomao’ is incredible, it must be a lie”. Option 2 was “Although it is incredible, it might be true”. Option 3 was 
“It is hard to say”. Option 4 was “Died from playing ‘Duo Maomao’ should be the truth”. Online at 
http://survey.news.sina.com.cn/result/30895.html. Accessed on January 5, 2011. 
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appreciated this humorous style, regardless which group they were in, or what their 
interests were. 
 
For instance, some commented on the game “Duo Maomao” using metaphors:114 
One teacher said, “Boys and girls, today, we’re going to play Duo 
Maomao.” As a result, all the flowers of our motherland pissed their 
pants.  
From now on, families with children should stop them playing Duo 
Maomao. So dangerous! Education must start from childhood. 
I suggest providing each prisoner a networked computer to play Red 
Alert, Warcraft or login Tianya when they have nothing to do. Then, 
their lives could be saved. 
 
Some were aiming at human rights, 
We Chinese citizens are legally enjoying our freedom of playing 
Duo maomao, Push-up115, and being the masters of ourselves, so 
happy.  
The detention house has paid so much attention to “human rights” 
and was so humane to the prisoners by allowing them playing games 
with their eyes blindfolded, so talented! 
 
And others said, 
The policeman would say, “Anything you can imagine, we can 
make it real”. 
 
The use of black humor made people relax in these online conversations, while 
leaving room for political thinking on law, governance, and institutions in private. It 
has much to do with Chinese social culture that was totally against any direct 
anti-authority speeches while tolerating periphrastic words. When silenced people are 
                                                        
114 Retrieved from http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1507781.shtml. Accessed January 25, 2011. 
115 The expression originated from another social event about a female student’s abnormal death. 
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involved in conversations, that is, in itself, a manifestation of power decentralization 
or resource redistribution, not least because it fosters social connection. 
 
The media companies — Tianya — were also involved in stirring up further 
communication among sympathizers. Some government officials and media workers 
the author interviewed confirmed that many high-profile social events had become 
well known and penetrated into offline action by virtue of media companies’ 
propaganda, as in the Duo Maomao-Case. As a business company, Tianya pays great 
attention to making profit and gaining reputation. As a social media, Tianya also 
makes effort in uncovering any information behind and taking responsibility for 
public welfare. For both purposes, Tianya uses diverse market strategies.  
 
To catch people’s attention, all news emphasized the word “Duo Maomao”, 
indicating just how ridiculous and irresponsible the Yunnan Provincial Government 
(YPG) was. As expected, thousands of Tianyaers criticized it as an excuse to avoid 
condemnation. Almost all posts there about this event said that they did not believe 
that a strong young man could die of playing DMM while in prison custody. The 
feeling of being badly cheated by the government inflamed the public and led directly 
to their scathing denouncement that it had to be stopped at that time.  
 
	   110 
Besides the usage of impressive words, moderators in some sub-communities have 
contributed a lot using their cyber-power. One moderator in “Media Arena”116 noted: 
At the very beginning, the information provider of DMM-Event 
contacted us immediately after he/she posted this event, hoping that 
we can publicize it effectively. After evaluating the value and 
importance of this case, we put it on the top of the front page. 
Technically, top posts will attract much more clicks than other posts 
without doubt, because of convenience and psychological belief. 
Moreover, we asked many traditional media, using our own relation 
sources, to uncover this event and many experts in law to analyze it. 
(Interviewee 14) 
 
What ordinary netizens see are just all kinds of posts written by people they do, or do 
not, know. Once engaged in the case, they care about nothing but how the case itself 
develops. Even more, one media company’s engagement caused a Domino effect: 
multiple websites, newspapers and magazines and even instant messaging copied or 
reproduced the piece of information within days, arousing strong public pressure 
which, in turn, promotes people’s active participation and forces the government to 
respond quickly. Moderators always manipulate the agenda: they decide on the topics 
first, and then invite honored guests to communicate with ordinary netizens. 
 
However, a media company’s selfish consideration is seldom accused. Most online 
activists know the existence of “Wu Mao Dang” (five-cent party), netizens who are 
hired or selected by the government to direct public opinion and exculpate the 
government from all kinds of evils. They also know the existence of a similar group 
of people hired by media companies to gain clicks, popularity and money. While the 
                                                        
116 A sub-community of Tianya Forum. 
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government’s main objective is to moderate the contention, the purpose of media 
companies is to stir, and intensify, conflicts. This public opinion bias facilitates 
collective mobilization. 
 
5.2.2.2 The Bifurcation of Public Attention  
Much later, the government’s efforts in relieving the pressure of public opinion in 
effect promoted it, as shown in Figure 5.1. On February 19, a notice in the name of 
YPG’s Propaganda Bureau was issued online, expecting to form an investigation 
committee including netizens in response to Internet-fuelled outcry and public quest 
to ascertain the truth. It is this measure that caused the case to develop into an 
unprecedented social event overnight, both online and offline. According to social 
movement theory, the success of collective action depends on “political opportunity 
structure” from the outside, which was made possible in this case. As a director in one 
department of Internet regulation in China said, “If the YPG did not take this strategy, 
this event was quite likely to be submerged by they public online and resulted in 
ignorance”. Till that evening, approximately 510 netizens had applied for this 
committee. Ultimately, through selection upon the priority in time, a semi-official 
investigation committee with eight netizens, four government officials and three 
media workers was set up (Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3 Members of Investigation Committee117 
Group Name Position 
Government 
official 
Fu Xiao Provincial Committee of 
Political and Legislative Affairs 
Government 
official 
Pu Ze Provincial Procuratorate 
Government 
official 




Guo Bin Public Security Bureau in 
Kunming 
Media worker Wang Yan Yunan Branch of Xinhua News 
Agency 
Media worker Wang Lei Yunnan Information News 
Media worker Yang Zhihui Yunnan Net 
Netizen Nickname: Fengzhimoduan 
Real name: Zhaoli  
Website Editor 
 (Committee Director) 
 Nickname: Bianmin 
Real name: Dongrubin 
Website Editor 
(Committee Deputy Direcor) 
 Real name: Peng Guojing A company of Science and 
Technology  
 Nickname: Wen Xing 
Real name: Wen Yuanzhao 
Website Moderator 
 Real name: Wang Yingwu Insurance salesman  
 Real name: Ni Ling Students from college 
 Nickname: Nengshijiang Freelancer 
 Nickname: Jibu 
Real name: He Xinwen 
Website Editor 
 
More importantly, fierce debates on its legitimacy and the fairness of selection, 
especially by many jurisprudents, were triggered within the contemporary Chinese 
legal framework. For Max Weber, the three resources of legitimacy are “charismatic 
authority”, “traditional authority” and “rational-legal authority”118. None of these 
could be applied in describing this investigation group. Organizations and institutions 
                                                        
117 For geographic convenience, these committee members are all from Yunnan Province. 
118 Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott 
Parsons (The Free Press and the Falcon's Bring Press, 1947), 325-328. 
	   113 
with legitimacy are ignored or violated by many government officials, let alone those 
without. In addition, although the deputy director “Bianmin” said in the investigation 
report, “Please do not underestimate our netizens’ legal knowledge, I have handled 
more than ten lawsuits, and Wen Xing is a famous local law journalist”119, it was 
clear that none of them was an expert in law, which inevitably limited their capability 
in seeking the truth. As a temporary group without hierarchical support and formal 
power, how can it compete with a governmental department? Will government 
officials take these passionate netizens seriously and let them do real investigation? 
Queries were inevitable.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, as a result, between February 19 and 23, 2009, public 
opinion changed from criticizing the local government to questioning both the 
government and committee members, including their identity, representativeness, 
capability and so on. Comments in the committee director’s post include120: 
It is definitely not a show, but a fake. If certain secretary of political 
and legislative affairs committee does this investigation, it is a show. 
But asking Wumao to pretend to be “netizens” is a fake, 
a-hundred-time more abominable than a show. (Netizen 
‘mountdew’) 
You humiliate my IQ! I would like to suicide with a bean curd! 
(Netizen ‘xueshnfeiyign’) 
They humiliate our IQ first, and then our personality. (Netizen 
‘dongfangdawei2008’) 
Biggest news: the investigation committee members seem to be 
Wumaos…(Netizen ‘Feiooo’) 
 
                                                        
119 Online at http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1512040.shtml. Accessed on September 29, 2010. 
120 Online at http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1507781.shtml. Accessed on January 25, 2011. 
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Public attention to government malfeasance, although not completely diverted, 
diminished after February 21, 2009. It is not clear why public opinion changed, but 
the establishment of the committee was probably a crucial factor. Many people 
believed that it was just a show the government played to appease the angry public. 
Even more, angry masses criticized these “selected” committee members as 
accomplices in covering up the truth. Sina.com’s survey findings to the question, 
“What do you think of Yunnan Government’s invitation of netizens”, are presented 
below. It shows that the majority of netizens doubted the legitimacy or efficacy of this 
committee. But public grievance against committee members was much lower, 
compared with their attitudes toward the event itself.  
 
Figure 5.3 What do you think of Yunnan Government’s invitation of netizens121 
 
                                                        
121 This question also received 59153 answers. Option 1 was “The investigation committee seems to be a show, 
and the role of netizens in it is doubtful”. Option 2 was “It is creative, and it can expand democracy and show the 
openness and transparency of the investigation”. Option 3 was “It is hard to say”. 
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Many more people believed that these netizen representatives were real, but may have 
been misled by the government: 
As a criminal case, it should have its own task force of local police. 
Then, you should think carefully about what’s the feature and 
purpose of this ‘investigation committee’. Pay attention, the 
organizer is the propaganda department, which seems has little to do 
with investigation of the case… It makes people doubt that it is just 
the strategy of the Yunnan Provincial Propaganda department to 
escape from the great public pressure, especially online pressure, 
and let this ridiculous investigation committee to undertake it. If it 
really wants you to participate, several things should be allowed to 
do, as I think… (Netizen ‘shazhude9966’) 122 
Online disputes intensified to a peak around February 20, 2009. 
 
Under this circumstance, the formation of heterophilous networks was shelved and 
the quality of these networks was challenged. But homophilous networks based on 
strong cynical viewpoints seemed to be strengthened. Many of these netizens in the 
committee, at least the director and deputy director, were previously online activists 
with better resources whom ordinary members respected and had good relations with. 
According to Table 4.2, activists’ active creation with public-centered purposes 
breeds heterophilous, and weak relations between them and non-activists. Their 
involvement in this committee, which lacks legitimacy and representativeness and 
must directly contact with government officials, reduces the effectiveness of 
collective action. Collective identity between non-activists and activists at this stage 
was difficult to foster.  
 
                                                        
122 Online at http://www.tianya.cn/publicforum/content/free/1/1507219.shtml. Accessed January 6, 2011. 
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5.2.2.3 Rational Introspection Benefited from Group Leadership 
All of the committee members visited the prison on February 20, 2009. On behalf of 
millions of netizens all over China, they still bore the public’s eager expectation as 
the first attempt. But the result turned out to be disappointing as predicted. After one 
day’s investigation, they wrote an online report on the success and failure of their 
action. They were very excited when informed of being selected and full of fantasies 
about the coming action. However, when the committee began to work, all of them 
felt embarrassed. Although they did get a lot of information others had never known 
before, they were pained at their inability to get to truth. The local government 
refused their request to view the surveillance video about Li’s cellmates and detained 
suspects. They suddenly felt that netizens who had been so powerful and popular 
online were powerless in real life. In law, only the judicial department had the power 
to expose wrongdoing using legal resources. Hence, social insecurity and corruption 
was quotidian; or, as one put it, “Even if it is informed that the man is died of a cat’s 
stretching, we still could do nothing, not to mention died of ‘eluding the cat’”.  
 
Although not all netizens appreciated their efforts, their sincere words had, at the very 
least, won them public understanding. Rational analyses and serious warnings from 
levelheaded online activists gradually redirected the public’s attention. Figure 5.1 
shows that the public’s questioning of the investigation committee had stopped from 
February 24, 2009. Three days later, on February 27, 2009, the YPG held a press 
conference announcing the government’s decision; public criticism against 
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government malfeasance aggregated again, and neutral comments on this case 
increased, but there were no longer any comments on the committee, whether positive 
or negative. According to some replies: 
The intention was good, but netizens can only be positioned as 
surveillants while the mass media as the watchdog instead of 
Pekingese. Please continue the supervising, and don’t ignore the 
principles of continuous monitoring and criticizing because of a 
‘tourism-oriented’ investigation committee. That’s the key. (Netizen 
‘mountdew’) 
There are many SBs in Zatan. They care more about whether 
Bianmin and Nengshijiang are Wumao than the truth of the event 
itself. Their logic is beat down Bianming and Nengshijiang first by 
labeling them as “ Wumao”, and then discuss about the truth of the 
homicide. (Netizen ‘Beipiaozouzu’) 
Especially in one netizen’s reply to the aforementioned netizen feiooo’s critics: 
You’ve confused ah! This is not the problem. If you interpret this 
event in this aspect, they just become scapegoats of certain persons. 
(netizen ‘huangshangdehuang’) 
After careful consideration, public opinion changed into a competition between hatred 
and understanding, of YPG and the Public Security Organ. 
 
Even though the investigation committee was not effective, we cannot conclude that it 
had failed. This first attempt made unexpected achievement. First of all, it enhanced 
the resource available to the members and to others. For instance, to show their 
sincere intention and to enhance fellows’ trust in them, almost all these 
representatives announced their real names and occupations (see Table 5.3). It gave 
others easy access to their personal characteristics, morality, and responsibility, and 
approaches to interact with them. For the committee members, the reward was 
symbolic, such as fame. 
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Moreover, cooperation with traditional media brought about new possibilities for 
resource transaction. On the one hand, socio-economic modernization has changed 
the nature of mass media in China, but only slightly. On the other hand, globalization 
and marketization have enhanced group consciousness of civic engagement. Also, the 
position of traditional media in people’s public life is undergoing challenges while the 
role of new media, particularly the Internet, is becoming even more influential. But in 
the near future, traditional media will not be replaced, since they hold significant 
social resources that new media are not able to acquire. For this reason: 
For many citizens, only information provided by traditional mass 
media is true and trustworthy. And only events reported by them 
will be taken seriously by the government, and later, be resolved. It 
is decided by the Chinese national condition. The Internet emerged 
later. Many Chinese people have not accepted it psychologically yet. 
No matter how fierce online debate is, they think it is just squalling 
or faked news. (Interviewee 14) 
Hence, their cooperation – the Internet, to quickly spread information; and traditional 
media, to increase the reliability – which facilitates resource exchange, eventually 
increases the power of mass media, creating sufficient alarm to force the government 
to react.  
 
Not surprisingly, resource redistribution was translated into social relation changes 
between non-activists and activists, between activists and government officials and 
among activists. The relationship between non-activists and activists is based 
primarily on their common hatred in the authority, as demonstrated in the famous 
maxim, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, and their need for each other – 
non-activists need activists’ resources to carry out their desires, while activists need 
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non-activists’ support. The relationship between activists is born from a desire to 
cherish each other. Finally, the last type is controversial, such as that between 
committee members – Fengzhimoduan, Bianmin, Wenxin – and the deputy secretary 
of YPG – Wu Hao.123 Because of the lack of a strong group leadership, further 
interaction or a fierce collective action did not take place.  
 
5.2.3 Termination of the DMM-Case 
The announcement of official punishment that catered to public opinion ultimately 
stopped the debate. On February 25, 2009, the case was transferred from Jinning 
County to Kuming People’s Procuratorate supervised by Yunnan Provincial People’s 
Procuratorate. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate in China sent its officials to 
conduct the investigation. Two days later, YPG Press formally announced the truth: 
Li was punched to death by prison gangs in the name of playing DMM.124 Afterward, 
relevant government officials were sentenced, just as the public had expected. 
According to current institutions and previous experience, it was impossible. The 
public succeeded in changing government decision-making and its hierarchy 
structure, creating the potential for a more egalitarian conclusion.  
 
                                                        
123 According to Wen Xin’s log on his personal blog, relationship with Wu Hao is a kind of netizenship, rather 
than arising from any kind of hierarchy. Online at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_48dbe8570100cwcx.html?tj=1. 
Accessed January 6, 2011. This log also shows the cooperation of different types of CMC, including posting in 
public forums, blogging, instant messaging and so on, which facilitates the formation of heterophilous relations. 
124  It also announced that five relative government officials had been punished politically, either dismissed or 
recorded of major demerit. Online at http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-02-27/212317303974.shtml. Accessed 
January 25, 2011. This result is meaningful since prison gangs represent the advantaged in real life. That is why 
the public became angry at this case immediately after the announcement. In fact, the contradiction between the 
advantaged and disadvantaged still remains the main origin of social instability and conflicts. 
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Since then, abnormal deaths in prison have been paid considerable attention, and the 
administration bureau of public security organ began gradually to open local 
detention houses to the public. But frankly, in this case, CMC ended up not being able 
to change government police directly, but to push it indirectly. With the publication of 
the truth by trustworthy mass media, netizens that gathered around this topic 
redirected their attention to other social hotspots. They continue to log in Tianya for 
information they need and communicate with others. Over time, an atmosphere of 
critical engagement and free expression is likely to be built bit by bit. 
 
During the period, thousands of posts generated on popular national websites 
everyday in China, most of which were clicked millions of times. The significance of 
this phenomenon lies in the possibility of forming special interest groups. Expressing 
individual complaints on certain issues in Tianya is likely to turn the topic into a 
public debate that can foster collective identity. The content of personal values has 
undergone gradual changes in this era, from heroism to citizenship, belonging and 
social solidarity. To defense these values attached to CMC, they organize web-based 
alliance and take action. Once moved from virtual communities to real life, online 
activism evolves into practical public crisis. 
 
So it may well be that the insertion of CMC into social relation building becomes an 
irreversible process, and the altered nature of collective mobilization indicates that the 
trajectories of collective action have also been changed. Previous evidence shows that 
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neighborhoods form the communities in agricultural societies, while workplaces 
played the same role in industrializing societies. Therefore, in digital societies, virtual 
community is where brand-new types of communication are being built to accumulate 
social capital.  
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Chapter 6 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
6.1 Mechanisms Summary  
This thesis centers on how people’s involvement in CMC contributes to both 
psychological and relational dimensions of social capital, in the absence of the rule of 
law and independent NGOs. In synthesizing the roles of CMC and virtual community, 
this thesis combines resource mobilization theory that stresses resource availability 
with social psychology theory that emphasizes emotional and cognitive feelings, 
identity and culture. Theoretical discussion on the two elements generalizes aspects 
regarding to the detailed mechanisms: resource distribution, relation building and 
collective mobilization.  
 
For clarity and concreteness of discussion, I chose to base my empirical data on 
Tianya, a well-known Chinese virtual community.  Established in 1999, Tianya has 
become “a weather vane of public opinion” among both traditional and new media in 
China. I was curious: what crucially drives the active participation in Tianya and the 
initiation of collective action in real life? My focus here is on community 
participatory design, structure and quality of social networks and community 
members, social context and government attitudes. A crucial methodological point 
this paper shares with many other researches is that “it was human beings who used 
these technologies in creative ways and under special historical circumstances that 
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have made modern Chinese politics more public, not the technologies alone”125. 
Through ethnographic investigation, Chapter 4 taps strategically into the first two 
mechanisms of social capital formation, reflecting the spontaneity, complexity and 
uncontrollability of CMC in the age of globalization.  
 
Chapter 5 then discusses the third mechanism — collective mobilization — and 
interprets the DMM-Case in detail to test these propositions. First of all, CMC in 
Tianya redistributes social resources transcending official boundaries in two aspects: 
the creation of new resources, and employment of existing resources. In both 
situations, political decentralization is selective due to the political regime and social 
context in China. To survive under stringent state censorship, participants have to 
behave cautiously and make a proper trade-off between state censorship and public 
requirement; or, in other words, between personal security and communicational 
effectiveness. One distinctive contribution of CMC in virtual communities is the 
tendency to assign resources to those most needed or qualified, either inside or 
outside the community. 
 
Secondly, relations among different social actors rebuild because of variation in 
resource availability. In this section, I have shown that the structure and quality of 
new relations depend not only on resource usage, but also on participatory purposes. 
This is diagrammatically presented in Table 4.2 in four combinations. When the 
                                                        
125 Zhou, 2005, 9. 
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purposes or ways of usage change, so do the forms of social relations. Different forms 
have different advantages and disadvantages, can be used on different occasions, and 
will result in different outcomes. In general, although online relations are more 
dispersive and intangible, they are also more stable in terms of being challenged by 
government strategies. Along with structural changes, interest-based shared identity 
and a sense of community change as a result of historical inheritance and CMC. 
 
Thirdly, involvement in events representing real-problems and with a minimum level 
of concreteness may be mobilized for collective action, generalized from the 
discussion of the top eight Internet-initiated events in 2009. I identified three key 
determinants that translate CMC and relations formed through it into collective 
actions: collective identity, group leadership, and social environment. Identity in this 
section is treated as a cognitive process that can generate a sense of “we”. The 
indispensability of group leadership in collective mobilization is articulated in 
seeming homophily but essential heterophily between non-activists and activists. The 
most significant aspect — heterophily — is manifest in how group leaders frame 
public understanding of a problem and alternative solutions to determine whether, and 
how, collective actions will be carried out.  
 
If CMC is the effort to bring real-life thorny issues into cyberspace for public 
attention and support, offline action is the process to bring virtual interaction into 
real-life context for effectual action. In authoritarian China, this offline-online-offline 
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loop is a powerful way to enable connection reformation across boundaries; as a 
consequence, the state has to change its policies to satisfy the public, or nationwide 
upheavals could occur. And this time, national upheavals are hard to be overwhelmed, 
at least not as easy as that during the 1989 Tiananmen student movement.  
 
6.2 Implications for CMC and Social Capital 
The mechanisms that demonstrate the effects of CMC on social capital may also be 
used to support other ways of participation in the future. The virtual community is not 
the only platform; new forms such as Twitter or micro blog in China seem to be 
substitutes. Although virtual communities derive great power in influencing people’s 
daily life nowadays, just as TV did in the second half of the last century, as a product 
of technological development, it must surely appear normal: new techniques of usage 
are born and flourish, while old ones vanish or weaken. Hence, the importance of 
CMC does not lie in the technology itself, but in the ways we devise to use it.  
 
As McClurg argues, although “social resources may close the participation gap that 
exists between low and high status individuals”, it could also breed social gaps as a 
result of their education, profession, knowledge and so on. It is understandable that 
some online social interactions may lead us to associational action, while others may 
lead us nowhere at all. However, in general, in the China context, it helps to bridge 
social relations with inactive or weak voluntary social organizations, moving it 
toward a better participatory culture. Future research could look into what types of 
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gaps are being built in this information era and how will they affect associational life.  
 
Cautiously, the assumptions here build on the fact that the average level of social 
capital in China is relatively low compared to democratic countries. In addition, social 
capital is no longer greatly emphasized as a panacea in challenging state control in the 
midst of transition. But it is a crucial element in developing democratic order in China, 
as does the Internet. For example, the increase in online participation could improve 
opportunities for netizens to manage their own affairs and influence government 
policies, while at the same time strengthening the role played by state power branches 
in Internet governance. As many experts on Chinese politics suggest, how the 
authority reacts to online activism or how online participation affects political agenda 
are worth investigating in the future. 
 
However, we should not be lured into the belief that other ways are necessarily better; 
were they to be put under the same scrutiny as mobilized over the last few years, they 
would most probably be found just as wanting. The slightest hint of a deficiency does 
not make the facilitating of social integration impossible. Gaps can be filled or 
narrowed and the expectation could well come true in the future, through the 
development of CMC. By exploring the mechanisms within certain limitation, it is 
possible to provide useful information for the construction of civil society and 
bottom-up democratization in China.  
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6.3 Limitations 
The ethnographic account of social capital transformation through CMC does provide 
a unique angle for understanding this topic, but it also has many limitations. First of 
all, qualitative data cannot be generalized to the entire Chinese population or even 
virtual environment since n value is small and the selection of interviewees is 
non-random. But discussion about Tianya, as the largest and most active virtual 
community in China, could contribute to a general understanding of CMC and the 
contentious sphere based on it. 
 
The most conspicuous feature of CMC is that spontaneous conversations which are 
frowned upon in traditional communities, online NGOs and many other organizations, 
actually facilitate resource exchange, produce real conversations, and breed the 
feeling of engagement as an essential part of daily life. These loose coalitions or 
groups through pro-individualist CMC are increasingly substituting for 
well-organized formal organizations. But this strength can also be read as a 
shortcoming: without strong incentives or group leadership, it is extremely hard to 
organize effective collective action through CMC. This is even more so in 
contemporary China, where it is still illegal for people to organize social movements 
without official permission, which makes Internet-based mobilization risky. 
 
Another problem lies in the discord between CMC and collective action: people 
engaged in online activities may choose not to take part in offline actions, while 
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people who take collective actions may not participate in online conversations. This 
inconsistency between cognition and behavior makes it hard to measure the exact 
causal mechanisms of CMC on social capital. But it connotes the diversity of CMC, 
which is a significant contributor to resource distribution and relation building. 
Evidence from interviews suggests that many online activists have participated in at 
least one event, even if it is not the one they discussed online.  
 
Although many Tianyers have discussed some personal and collective benefits from 
the proliferation of CMC, whether sharing general patterns or showing particular 
features, there are still a sizeable number of waverers engaging in online 
conversations e.g., waging guerilla warfare. For these, their focus is not to obtain 
resources or build. Moreover, to these non-activists or non-netizens, virtual 
community is still a world of illusion and imagination with little reality: 
Many netizens use typed symbols to denote different kinds of 
emotions. As a newbie once in one community, I cannot understand 
what others are talking about, because there are all kinds of strange 
and special words in their posts, which can only be understood by 
people within their circles. So I quitted. And now, I find that these 
virtual communities are just something out of these participants 
illusion. Will they help a lot with our daily life? I don’t think so. (A 
non-netizen) 
 
This problem also displays the weak online-offline connection, which impedes the 
process of effective grasping individuals in isolation and mobilizing actions. Furious 
form of CMC happens when it penetrates into the offline life. At the very least, 
mobilization turns out to be more effective and sustainable when cooperated with 
	   129 
real-life mass media. As an aspirant moderator believes: 
The contemporary major task of developing Tianya Virtual 
Community is to evolve online friends to offline friends, and help 
offline citizens adapt to online life. Certainly, both sides are very 
contradictory to it. But finding the approach to ‘tangible’ virtual 
communities is of great importance and value. (Interviewee 2) 
 
The limitation in the study of DMM-Case lies in two aspects: firstly, I did not directly 
take part in online conversations about “Duo Maomao” then and there; secondly, I 
failed in my attempt to secure interviews with these committee members after trying 
several times. The lack of direct participation keeps me away from the effervescence 
of CMC and disenables socialization into the participatory culture. Besides, I noticed 
the apprehension and unwillingness of the committee members to talk about the 
investigation committee anymore. It also displays that preexisting relations is of 
serious concern to CMC. I believe that if I could have interviewed at least one of the 
committee members, I could have obtained more vivid information for this analysis. 
However, four members’ reports on their investigation, posted in Tianya, offered 
first-hand material on the case and provide sufficient material for discussion. 
 
This paper addresses only a few aspects on the central lessons of socio-Internet 
pattern I believe to have noteworthy applicability and effects in China. Afterward, the 
relationship between the two is still indeterminate. More importantly, the next agenda 
should be on how to develop dispersed online event-based interaction into organized 
routine communication and action aimed at gradually transforming the society as a 
whole. In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that no simple answers exist for these 
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complicated processes and concrete examples. I only hope that this paper has 
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Appendix A. 
An Outline of Interview Questions 
 
1. Background information 
Age: 
Education: 
Immigrants or not: 
Occupation: 
 
2. Knowledge about Tianya 
2.1 How long have you been a member of Tianya, how often do you visit 
Tianya, and how much time do you spend there each time? 
2.2 What does virtual community mean to you? (Information center, gathering 
place…) 
2.3 What kind of power do you have in Tianya? Or what can you do here? 
2.4 What kind of power do you want to have, besides what you currently 
have? 
2.5 What do you know about community rules? 
2.6 Do you feel free in Tianya? Have your posts ever been blocked or 
removed by webmasters in Tianya? How did you react?  
 
3 Participatory Purposes 
3.1 Why did you decide to take part in virtual communities, rather than real 
communities? How do you deal with anyonymity, pseudonymity?  
3.2 What do you do in Tianya, and for what purposes? Do you participate in 
any other virtual community besides Tianya? (If yes, which ones? What 
are the differences between Tianya and other communities? If not, why not? 
Why do you choose Tianya?) 
3.2.1 Get information: what type of information? 
3.2.2 Communicate with others: mostly with friends or strangers? 
Why not do the same things with your schoolmates or 
colleagues in real life? 
3.2.3 Uncover some dark things in this society: mainly in which 
aspects? Why do you do that through the Internet or Tianya? 
What is your main concern? 
3.2.4 Protect personal rights: what kinds of rights? 
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4 Resources gained through Tianya 
4.1 Most of the time, do you consume resources or create resources? (These 
resources could be long-term guanxi resources, or instant help…) 
Respectively, what kind? 
4.1.1 Consume resources: where, and how, do you try to get them? 
4.1.2 Create resources: how do you create? (analyze something, 
make videos?) 
4.1.3 What did you do when your purposes cannot be realized in 
Tianya? (e.g., the resources you needed cannot be obtained in 
Tianya, or the resources you created were not highly 
recognized or welcomed by others?) 
4.2 Through online participation, what do you feel? Any change in your life? 
Did you get or lose something? Materially or spiritually? 
4.3 Did you share these resources with anyone? What was their reaction? Can 
you give an example? 
 
 
5 Relationship between individuals 
5.1 How do you perceive strangers in Tianya? (scores accumulated through 
behaviors, position in Tianya, followers, or through direct online 
communication…) 
5.2 How do you interact with people online? Is there any difference in 
interaction between different groups of people? (depth, using 
applications…) 
5.3 Have you made any good friends online? Can you give an example of how 
it happened? 
5.4 Have you ever experienced any difficulty or trouble in communicating 
with anyone based on differences in social status, knowledge or interest? 
5.5 Has the knowledge or interest barrier prevented you from building 
relationships with them? How? 
5.5.1 How did you get around the difficulty? 
5.5.2 How did you resolve it? 
5.6 Have you ever been persuaded by others in Tianya? How did that happen? 
5.7 How are your online interpersonal relations, compared with traditional 
social relations? More dispersive, flexible, powerful? 
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6 Mobilization for collective action through virtual communication 
6.1 Have you ever participatef in any collective action?  
If no, why not? If yes, answer the following questions. 
6.2 What is the most important factor in mobilizing your active participation 
in collective action? (discourse-driven, market-driven, or 
government-driven) Can you give an example? 
6.3 What is the main impact (or change) on you before and after the action? 
(Towards the community, towards people, or your personal value 
system…) How did it happen? 
6.4 What are the main changes in your group, especially the subtle relations 
among your group members? 
6.4.1 Do you keep contact with each other now? 
6.4.2 What is the basis of your relationship? 
6.5 What is the most serious difficulty in carrying out this collective action or 
in making it successful? 
6.5.1 Why would you stick with the cause in the face of problems? 
6.5.2 How would you proceed with other members? 
 
 
7 Would you perceive yourself as an activist? Why? 
 
 
8 Do you know anyone you think is an online activist in Tianya?  
8.1  How did you know him/her? 
8.2  What is your relationship with him/her now? 
 
 
